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This Week in Ridiculous Regulations

Happy New Year, everyone. We’re doing a slightly different format this week, on account of the new year starting mid-week. With just two days’ worth of data so far, year-to-date totals and annual projections for 2020 are not yet very informative. Also, Wayne Crews did a year-end look at regulation in 2019 for Forbes, and I did one here. In another piece, Wayne found that for every law passed by Congress in 2019, agencies issued 28 new regulations. He calls this ratio the Unconstitutionality Index. See also related coverage in the Washington Examiner (twice) and the Epoch Times. With those bases already covered, this week’s roundup will simply summarize last week’s new regulation highlights so they don’t get lost in the ether. Back to business as usual next week.

From the 27 final regulations issued from December 30-31, 2019:

From the 21 final regulations issued from January 2-3, 2020 (no Federal Register on New Year’s Day):

For more data, see Ten Thousand Commandments and follow @10KC and @RegoftheDay on Twitter.

In the Media: Regulation

Wayne Crews and I are both quoted in an Epoch Times writeup on regulatory burdens in 2019.

Charles Davenant on the Need for Humility in Policymaking

Douglas Irwin, on page 53 of his 1996 book Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade, quotes from page 32 of Charles Davenant’s 1696 Essay on the East India Trade:

“Wisdom is most commonly in the wrong, when it pretends to direct nature.”

This wisdom applies to much more than trade restrictions and government-granted monopolies.

How Much Federal Regulation Was There in 2019?

Happy New Year, everyone. Now that 2019 is just about over, we have some data on how much new regulation hit the books. Note that these numbers are preliminary and might change. The source for most of the numbers is FederalRegister.gov. The page number counts are taken from the Federal Register’s daily digest email. Wayne Crews’ Ten Thousand Commandments also has abundant data.

The general story the numbers tell is that the Trump administration has been steadily increasing its pace of regulatory activity. It has enacted some positive reforms through Executive Order, such as its one in, two out rule, and two orders to make regulatory dark matter more transparent. Dark matter is regulation that has the force of law, but never went through the proper public notice-and-comment rulemaking process. The administration missed an opportunity to codify these reforms in proper legislation when Republicans held both chambers of Congress, so these reforms are vulnerable to reversal when the White House eventually changes hands. In the long run, this may end up as the Trump administration’s biggest missed opportunity.

Deregulatory efforts will likely continue in 2020, but will likely to be more than offset by regulatory increases elsewhere. Trade barriers have more than doubled since 2017. While the USMCA trade agreement will keep tariffs against Canada and Mexico in check, it contains substantial new regulatory burdens and non-tariff trade barriers. Upcoming agreements with China, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, if these happen, due in part to USMCA’s precedent, will also likely contain substantial new regulatory burdens.

The emerging antitrust alliance between national conservatives on the right and progressives on the left may also result in major new regulatory barriers against competition that will not necessarily show up in rule counts or Federal Register page counts.

With that for context, here are some early data on new regulation in 2019:

  • There were 2,106 proposed regulations in 2019. This is very close to 2018’s 2,072 proposed regulations, and a nearly 15 percent increase from the Trump administration’s first year figure, 1,837 proposed regulations in 2017.

  • 2,964 final regulations. This is down from 2018’s 3,367 final regulations and 2017’s 3,280 final regulations. This makes 9,405 new final regulations during the Trump administration from its January 20, 2017 inauguration through year-end 2019. At that pace, it will likely pass the 10,000 mark in February or March 2020.

  • 21,804 agency notices. This is where a lot of regulatory dark matter appears—rules which have the force of law, but were never put through the proper rulemaking process, which includes a public notice-and-comment period. 2019 was down slightly from 2018’s 22,025 notices and 2017’s 22,137 notices. From inauguration through year-end 2019, the Trump administration issued 64,485 agency notices.

  • 72,561 Federal Register pages. This is the highest figure of the Trump era, and a sharp increase over the Trump administration’s first two years. Using adjusted page counts, the 2018 Federal Register was 64,582 pages, and 2017’s was 61,950 pages. Significantly, 2019’s page-count increase happened despite near-zero activity during the month of January, when the federal government was partially shut down. It is likely that at least some pages that would have appeared in January instead appeared during later months, resulting in little total change. But it is also possible items were simply never published—which likely represents decreased transparency rather than decreased activity. We will likely never know the exact balance.

Interesting, and busy, times are ahead.

This Week in Ridiculous Regulations

Federal workers got a three-day week as a Christmas present this year. Agencies still put out 323 notices, 50 proposed regulations, and 1,342 Federal Register pages. Just two more Federal Register editions remain in 2019. New final regulations for the week range from guaranteed housing loans to mercury management fees.

On to the data:

  • Last week, 35 new final regulations were published in the Federal Register, after 63 the previous week.
  • That’s the equivalent of a new regulation every four hours and 48 minutes.
  • Federal agencies have issued 2,937 final regulations in 2019. At that pace, there will be 2,961 new final regulations. Last year’s total was 3,367 regulations.
  • Last week, agencies published 323 notices, for a total of 21,589 in 2019. At that pace, there will be 21,676 new notices this year. Last year’s total was 21,656.
  • Last week, 1,342 new pages were added to the Federal Register, after 2,064 pages the previous week.
  • The 2019 Federal Register totals 71,734 pages. It is on pace for 72,313 pages. The 2018 total was 68,302 pages. The all-time record adjusted page count (which subtracts skips, jumps, and blank pages) is 96,994, set in 2016.
  • Rules are called “economically significant” if they have costs of $100 million or more in a given year. Four such rules have been published this year. Five such rules were published in 2018.
  • The running cost tally for 2019’s economically significant regulations currently ranges from savings of $4.39 billion to $4.08 billion, mostly from estimated savings on federal spending. The 2018 total ranges from net costs of $220.1 million to $2.54 billion, depending on discount rates and other assumptions.
  • Agencies have published 66 final rules meeting the broader definition of “significant” so far this year. 2018’s total was 108 significant final rules.
  • So far in 2019, 492 new rules affect small businesses; 22 of them are classified as significant. 2018’s totals were 660 rules affecting small businesses, with 29 of them significant.

Highlights from last week’s new final regulations:

For more data, see Ten Thousand Commandments and follow @10KC and @RegoftheDay on Twitter.

Politics by Meme

Here is a political meme that has been making the rounds on social media:

No photo description available.

I agree with this one of this meme’s main points–the federal government spends too much on corporate welfare. But its numbers are way off.

  • The biggest tax most $50,000 earners pay is the 15.3 percent FICA tax, which pays for Social Security and Medicare. That’s $7,650 on a $50,000 income, and it isn’t in the meme’s list.
  • Medicare, at 2.9 percentage points of the 15.3% FICA tax, costs $1,450 on a $50,000 income, not $235.81–plus premiums, if applicable. The meme is wrong here by more than six-fold. Not six percent, six-fold.
  • Spending $4,000 on corporate welfare implies that about 8 percent of national income goes to corporate welfare, or about $1.7 trillion. The actual figure is likely between $100 and $200 billion–a precise figure is impossible due to a lack of government transparency, and disagreements over definitions. Even allowing for substantial wiggle room, here the meme is off by as much as 10-fold. That is an entire order of magnitude.
  • A $50,000 earner spending $247.75 on military spending implies a military that spends more than $1 trillion. That is about $300 billion higher than the actual figure. The meme is wrong here by almost half. Though to be fair, much military spending is corporate welfare, and is unnecessary for national security besides.

Again, this meme makes a point I agree with about corporate welfare. It confirms my priors. But it does so dishonestly. Its numbers are wrong, often by multiples. And its errors all favor the point it tries to make. That one-sided tilt means its mistakes are probably not just random error. Whoever made it is hurting a good cause.

I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again. Politics-by-meme is harmful. Do not engage in it. Political memes are as bad as cable news. Their numbers are often dodgy. Their primary accomplishments are feeding confirmation bias while intensifying people’s unhealthy tribal tendencies to affirm one’s in-group affiliation while vilifying out-groups. Political memes add heat without light at a time when the opposite approach is badly needed.

Immanuel Wallerstein – The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century

Immanuel Wallerstein – The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century

Wallerstein was the primary creator of the core-periphery framework that many historians use to view world economic history. This 1974 book started it all. Several publishers rejected his initial manuscript, but when he did finally get it published, it caught on quickly. Wallerstein eventually completed four volumes in the series before he passed away in 2019.

In the context of the 16th century, the first major core country was Spain, though the Netherlands and England eventually overtook it as silver-induced inflation and the costs of empire caused Spanish decline. The two periods of Spanish dominance and Dutch-English dominance make up what Wallerstein calls the long 16th century. The periphery economies were the somewhat nearby countries that traded with these core economies throughout the long 16th century, and on through later periods.

Typically, periphery economies provide raw materials and food, which the core countries either consume or turn into more finished products. At this stage of the world economy, there were still countries outside of the European core-periphery network. For Wallerstein, these are simply separate economic systems. The boundaries are fluid, and Wallerstein was quick to point out that his categories are not categorical. Countries such as Poland and the Ukraine were nearly always periphery countries in this period. Russia went in and out of the periphery over the years. Farther-off countries such as India and China had their own independent core-periphery networks.

By the 20th century, with industrialization, mass media, and air travel, the entire world was unified into a single core-periphery system. In this book’s focus, the two-part “long 16th century,” this had not yet happened. But this was also the period when that process began in earnest, which is why Wallerstein’s larger project began there.

Wallerstein was a Marxist, and it shows in his hyper-materialist view of history, and his neglect of individuals in favor of focusing on aggregates such as nations, regions, and classes. It also causes him to ignore non-material factors such as culture, art, social norms about openness and progress, and more. Though he favorably cites Douglass North a few times, proving at least some engagement with the economic history literature, he also is not the most astute economic analyst, especially in matters of monetary policy. He seems not to grasp the concepts of equilibrium, the neutrality of money, or the law of one price. These shortcomings are not fatal to his core-periphery thesis, but they don’t help his case.

As the world becomes ever more prosperous in the 21st century, Wallerstein’s core-periphery framework is quickly becoming obsolete. It’s not the worst way to view the history of empires of colonialism, which are based on exploitation and hierarchy. But the world of the post-1800 Great Enrichment is based increasingly on equal exchange and cross-cultural tolerance and respect. There is a long way to go, obviously, and there will be stutters and reversal. But if the process continues, Wallerstein’s thesis will age as poorly as his Marxism already has.

Kimberly Clausing – Open: The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital

Kimberly Clausing – Open: The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital

This is a book that needed to be written. Progressives have long had a complicated relationship with trade and immigration. On one side, there is a free-trade tradition including progressive heroes such as Cordell Hull, FDR’s Secretary of State; President John F. Kennedy, who passed the 1962 Trade Expansion Act and after whom a major round of liberalizing GATT negotiations was named; and Bill Clinton, who signed NAFTA in to law.

On the other side, the progressive movement’s labor and environmental wings often have at best a transactional relationship with free trade, and at worst an outright hostility to it. Many younger people with social democratic leanings, as well as the older generation of presidential candidates, such as Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, have views on trade that are almost identical to President Trump’s. This is a problem Clausing seeks to address.

She mostly makes the usual economists’ arguments in favor of free trade and immigration. This is fine; trade scholars are not her intended audience, progressives are. Clausing’s progressive credentials help to open the ears of an audience that is often closed to similar messages from different messengers. One particular reason that should resonate more than it does is that free trade and liberal immigration are extremely effective anti-poverty policies. And here, Clausing does a good job of explaining why. But she encounters two problems in her book, one of which is not her doing.

Part of the problem in getting more progressives to support pro-poor trade and immigration policies ties into a political realignment that is currently happening, as the historian Stephen Davies and my colleague Iain Murray have been arguing. For most of the post-war period, the dominant political debate was capitalism vs. socialism. Most people and political parties placed themselves somewhere on that spectrum, and thought of themselves in those terms. That dynamic is largely gone now. Just as conservatives under Trump are no longer a free-market-lite party, progressives are no longer a socialism-lite party, younger social democrats’ pretensions to the contrary. Their fight is on different grounds now.

People are beginning to realign themselves on a different axis—nationalism vs. globalism. Conservatives are rapidly taking over the nationalist side. But progressives haven’t quite chosen their path yet—this complicate’s Clausing’s job. Part of the problem is personality. Trump provides a strongly nationalist figure for conservatives to rally around. As of this writing the progressive side lacks such a figure, whether also a nationalist or more cosmopolitan. There is not likely room for two nationalist parties, but Democrats still haven’t made their choice. If Clausing pushes them in the cosmopolitan direction, she will have done a major service.

These political realignments happen every few generations. The current realignment is neither the first nor last time something like this will happen. But it does explain an awful lot of strange political bedfellows in recent years. Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump essentially have the same immigration beliefs, and for similar reasons. Fox News host Tucker Carlson was surprised to find himself very much agreeing with Democratic Senator and presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren’s economic patriotism plan.

Large parts of Open also have little to with trade and immigration. I am unsure of whether this is a good thing or a bad thing. Her digressions on taxes, regulations, and inequality are standard-issue, and progressives will find little to object to. On the plus side, this can make her market-liberal trade and immigration stances more palatable, especially to progressives still unsure about their place on the nationalism-cosmopolitanism divide. On the other hand, her proposed regulatory policies would reduce the benefits of open trade and immigration. And her views on inequality focus on ratios, rather than people, precisely opposite the liberal approach that would help the poor. For more on this, see Iain Murray’s and my papers on the subject, “People, Not Ratios” and “The Rising Tide.”

Flaws and all, Clausing has written an important book that has the potential to do a lot of good. Ideally, she will not only nudge progressives in a more free-market direction on trade and immigration policy, she will encourage them to take a more cosmopolitan stance in order to provide an effective opposition to an increasingly nationalist conservative movement.

Mark Forsyth – The Elements of Eloquence: Secrets of the Perfect Turn of Phrase

Mark Forsyth – The Elements of Eloquence: Secrets of the Perfect Turn of Phrase

Just as German seems to have a word for just about every feeling or situation, English and Latin seem to have a word for just about every way to use words. Forsyth knows not just how to use English’s many figures of speech, from metonomy to assonance, but he knows their names—most of which this reader has already forgotten again.

He is also very funny. This book is less about improving one’s writing, and more about having fun with language while admiring how crafty some of its best practitioners can be. Forsyth has a way of making fun of Shakespeare while showing how truly talented he was. He also doesn’t confine himself to stuffy classics in his examples, and uses references to popular music and recent movies even younger readers would be familiar with. This book is short, reads easily, and Forsyth’s sly, ever-present humor makes for an entertaining read. Hopefully the reader also gets a sense of how to avoid writing the kind of purple prose Forsyth might mock.

Bill Bryson – A Short History of Nearly Everything

Bill Bryson – A Short History of Nearly Everything

A history of science that is accessible to nearly everyone. This would be an excellent gift for a bright middle schooler or high schooler who is interested in science, or for adults who enjoy trivia. Bryson covers all the main sub-disciplines, including cosmology, geology, chemistry, biology, archaeology, anthropology, and more. He also tells some stories about the scientists behind many major discoveries, but without overdoing it—ahem, Neil Degrasse Tyson. The breadth comes at the expense of depth, but that is not the worst of sins for a book like this. Interested readers can find plenty of additional reading for topics that spark their interest.

Bryson is a bit of a sensationalist, leaning heavily on apocalyptic scenarios wherever possible, from the odds of meteor strikes to catastrophic earthquakes or volcanic eruptions. This worst-first tendency harms his credibility as a narrator and gives off a bit of a boy crying wolf vibe, but one understands the strategy as a way to create excitement for younger people and scientific novices.