Category Archives: International

Book Review: Thucydides – The Peloponnesian War

Thucydides – The Peloponnesian War

Thucydides wrote the second volume in the unofficial trilogy of great Greek historians. He begins almost exactly where Herodotus’ Histories ends. Having defeated Persia, Athens now finds itself at war with Sparta. This time, Athens would lose. But Thucydides, who participated in the war, does not see it through to the end. No one is quite sure why. Fortunately, Xenophon would later pick up the baton and finish the war and the “trilogy” in his Hellenica.

Where Herodotus is filled with legends, exoticism, and fantastical creatures, Thucydides is more earthbound. The gods are absent, he never leaves the Pelopennese, his prose style is plain, he consciously sticks to the facts, and his organization is meticulously chronological. Each chapter covers exactly one year, and if important events and themes do not respect those boundaries, so be it. The contrast in historiography, or historical method, is as interesting as the actual history itself.

The Peloponnesian War also contains Pericles’ famous funeral oration, which is one of the heights of Greek literature. Many of the other speeches Thucydides recounts also have high literary value. He stands out in his attempt to humanize his opponents and to understand their points of view. Rather than smear Spartans with ad hominems the way many modern political writers do their opponents, Thucydides sought understanding and objectivity. He saw his task as leaving a reliable record, not making the case for his side events.

At the very least, Thucydides assumes good intentions and noble deeds among the enemy he fought and lost to. Thucydides understood that if one is going to lose, better that it be to a noble opponent than to a weak and immoral one. There are lessons here for today’s politicians as well as the crass Internet commenters who egg them on.

Book Review: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alistair Smith – The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alistair Smith – The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2011)

The rise in populism over the last decade has birthed a bumper crop in books on dictators, with contributions from Frank Dikötter, Daniel Kalder, and others. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s entry is a quality addition. The reigning classic in the genre, though, is Gordon Tullock’s early work on the public choice theory of autocracies, which is collected in The Social Dilemma, which is volume 8 of his Selected Works.

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith work from the discipline of foreign policy, rather than from economics, law, or political science. They belong to the realist school, which is in some ways the current incarnation of Machiavellianism and realpolitik. Foreign policy realists have quite a bit in common with public choice economics—politicians respond to incentives, and tend to behave in self-interested ways.

The Dictator’s Handbook is a popular-level distillation of a larger theory of autocratic behavior Bueno de Mesquita and Smith have explored in numerous academic works. Dictators often show strong ideologies in public. These are often various forms of socialism, nationalism, theocracy, or some mixture of the three. In private, dictators may sincerely believe in their ideology. And it will influence their policy choices. But, just as public choice theory argues, when self-preservation conflicts with the ideology, self-preservation nearly always wins.

This self-preservation instinct explains why so many dictatorships look so similar. Military support is essential to maintaining power, which is why dictatorships often have lavish and showy military budgets, even if they do not have any intention of going to war. Well-paid soldiers are less likely to rebel, especially in poor countries where other career opportunities are limited. A highly visible military projects power, which scares off rebels inside and outside of the palace. And a well-fed and well-feted general is less likely to pursue his own coup.

Gaudy personal styles and decorating styles are another common dictator trait; nearly every dictator’s residence, whether in Belarus or Libya, is almost indistinguishable from Donald Trump’s apartment in Trump Tower. It’s another way of projecting power, if not taste.

A dictator’s inner circle is often unstable. This is both caused and countered with a culture of excessive honorifics and ostentatious wealth—with obvious gradations to signify an official’s place in the hierarchy. Taking privileges away is a sign that someone is falling out of favor.

Dictators rarely have a formal succession plan. This is another reason why they usually have a garish, privileged court culture. Dictatorships are typically in very poor countries. Officials who enjoy a Western standard of living—courtesy of the dictator, they are constantly reminded—are less likely to overthrow the dictator. Moreover, when aspirants are competing against each other, they are not competing against the dictator himself. When generals have a comically large number of lapel pins on their epaulet-laden uniforms, there is a reason for it. They are status signals in their competitive game against each other. They are not just marks of favor from the leader.

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith run a risk of stereotyping by pointing out how alike so many dictators are. But they are well aware that each country, and each dictator, has their own situation and cultural factors in play. At the same time, their commonalities show a kind of convergent evolution: successful dictators stay in power because they have discovered “best practices” that apply widely. Dictators that did not adopt these practices did not stay in power, so the only remaining examples have strong militaries, garish styles, elaborate court cultures, no formal succession plan, and so on. While the world as a whole has been tending towards democratic liberalism since the end of World War II, there are still plenty of illiberal countries. It is important to understand them if their people are to become free.

It is also important to know warning signs when we see them, as the tragedy of President Trump’s late-term coup attempt shows.

Best Books of 2020: Joseph Henrich – The WEIRDest People in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2020)

It’s early, but The WEIRDest People in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous by Joseph Henrich will likely be one of the new decade’s most influential books. Henrich complements work by Joshua GreeneRichard WranghamJonathan HaidtSteven PinkerMichael Shermer, and others on the psychological underpinnings of modern liberalism—liberalism in the more-or-less original sense of the word.

Henrich’s book has two main arguments. One is historical: The Catholic church, completely unintentionally, set off a social chain reaction that created modernity. The second is psychological: People in modern societies are psychologically distinct than people in traditional kin-based societies.

He uses the acronym WEIRD for Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic, to describe the unusual people in modern market-liberal societies. If you are reading this book review, then you are probably WEIRD, and so is nearly everyone you know. But we WEIRD people are the outliers in human history. Outside of Europe, East Asia, and North America, there are very few of us.

Most human societies are built on kin-based structures. This was true during our hunter-gatherer past, which was about 190,000 years of our 200,000-year history—95 percent of our species’ time on Earth. Societies remained kin-based through the agricultural revolution, and through the birth of cities about 6,000 years ago. And it is still true today in most countries. Despite occasional flowerings, there were no enduring WEIRD societies in human history until about two centuries ago. This is maybe one tenth of one percent of human existence, and even then, most societies remain kin-based. Again, it is WEIRD people who are unusual.

What is a kin-based society? In these, business partnerships, social networks, and marriages are confined to networks that rarely stray outside the extended family or clan. People tend to be wary of non-kin, and have a strong in-group-vs.-out-group worldview. People tend to look out for their clan’s collective interest over their individual interest. In kin-based societies, nepotism isn’t frowned upon; it’s the norm. WEIRD Americans today look askance when a president appoints inexperienced family members to be senior advisers. But in most other societies, this would have been acceptable, even normal behavior.

By contrast, WEIRD people are more individualistic and more trusting of outsiders. Kin-based families often arrange marriages for their children. WEIRD people usually marry for love. Kin-based people are expected to enter the family business. This is why so many of us have occupation-based surnames, such as Smith, Baker, or Fisher. WEIRD people usually prefer to choose their own line of work, which is one reason why today’s Smiths, Bakers, and Fishers rarely practice those occupations.

Kin-based people are reluctant to do business with strangers and foreigners. WEIRD people are more open to trade and more trusting of potential business partners they have never met. Nobody is purely meritocratic, but WEIRD people are closer to that ideal than most people.

So now that we know the difference between most people and WEIRD people, what is Henrich’s historical argument about the Catholic church accidentally making today’s WEIRD-ness possible?

The Catholic church blew up traditional kin networks through what Henrich calls its unofficial “Marriage and Family Program (MFP).” In short, the Church prohibited cousin marriages. The incest taboo is a human universal. But its boundaries vary from place to place. The church decided to push them progressively further out over a period of centuries. In many places, it eventually prohibited marriages closer than second and third cousins. In a few places it briefly went as far as eighth cousins.

This was a bigger deal than it sounds. Back in, say, the 12th century, people lived isolated lives. Few people lived in cities. Many people lived their entire lives within a 30-mile radius. They met few, if any, people outside of their extended families. And the wanderers they did meet were often beggars, vagrants, or outlaws. The Church’s MFP forced these isolated people to look outside their villages and kin groups for marriage partners. This forced openness, in the long run, ended up wiring people’s brains differently.

Young people are impressionable. When they are of marriageable age and are forced to meet and interact with strangers, and travel among them, traditional closed-kin psychological barriers gradually break down. They are gradually replaced with growing degrees of WEIRDness. It is a long, gradual process with many degrees. But over centuries, the effects add up.

None of the changes Henrich describes are genetic. None of them are racial, and none of them are peculiar to Europe. The conditions that make individuals WEIRD are cultural, intellectual, and psychological.

Using cousin marriage rates as a stand-in for how strong the Church’s Marriage and Family Program operated in different regions, along with historical records, Henrich finds that the MFP was the single biggest cause of everything from per capita GDP to interest rates to murder rates. Interestingly, regional cousin marriage rates closely track religious divisions and regional church influences. Henrich himself was skeptical about the MFP’s cultural influence, so he checked his results every way he could.

So, while openness is the real engine of WEIRDness, in Europe’s case, Church doctrine was what drove the process of opening up.

The differences between kin-based and WEIRD people show up in psychological tests. The Church’s MFP turns out to have changed people’s personalities and psychological profiles. In my recent review of Virgil Storr and Ginny Choi’s excellent Do Markets Corrupt Our Morals?, I noted their finding that people from market societies play decision-making games differently than do people in non-market societies. Henrich argues that this is because they are psychologically different.

From birth, WEIRD people from market societies have been more exposed to outsiders and more likely to trust them. No wonder they tend to play lab games that way. They tend to be more trusting of other players and more willing to use long-term strategies. People from kin-based societies are more likely to do the equivalent of a dine-and-dash from a restaurant. If the other player is not from their in-group, they feel fewer compunctions about cheating that other player.

Kin-based and WEIRD people even assign blame differently. Most WEIRD people see classroom teachers’ disciplinary tactic of punishing an entire class for one student’s offense to be morally wrong. Kin-based people see this as normal, and are fine with it. They think more in terms of collective responsibility than individual responsibility. In fact, criminal justice systems in many kin-based societies punish whole families for one member’s crime.

There is a reason for this. In most human societies, life was precarious. One bad harvest could mean starvation. Very strong conformity norms were a survival advantage. Collective punishment helps to reinforce conformity norms. Maybe someone does have a new idea for planting a crop differently. But if it fails, the stakes are life and death. It’s probably not worth it. Better to make sure that everyone sticks with what he or she knows works.

When most people’s only experience with foreigners is with either castoffs or invading armies, they probably aren’t going to trust them. They’d probably return the favor when possible. Unlike trade, theft and war are zero-sum interactions. When these are someone’s sole experience with out-groups, they are less likely to trade with foreigners and realize the benefits of division of labor. Safer to do it all yourself.

Henrich has written a provocative book that builds on an already robust literature. Despite its deep historical and psychological content, The WEIRDest People in the World is also highly relevant to modern public policy. The regulations and legislation that groups like CEI deal with on a daily basis do not come from a vacuum. They come from longstanding political institutions. And these system-level institutions in turn come from culture. All three of those levels matter. A reformer who works on only one of them will fail. Henrich has come up with a plausible framework to explain how they interact over the long run, and how they can shift. Where people are relatively WEIRD, people will build relatively market-oriented political institutions—and eventually, policies. Where they are kin-based, they probably won’t.

Without the Church’s unofficial Marriage and Family Plan, European culture likely would have remained insular and kin-based. That tendency still exists, and is expressing itself in the European Union’s trending towards becoming a protectionist trading bloc. Reformers need to push back and remind people that WEIRD-style openness has massive benefits, especially for the poor.

What about the rest of the world? Fortunately, the Church’s MFP is not the one and only way for people to become psychologically WEIRD. Ideas can be imported and exported, same as goods and services. America was a relatively WEIRD society from the start, as was Australia. The Asian tigers such as Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong, saw the economic success of WEIRD countries, and followed their example. China is at a weird midway point psychologically, and its institutions are still extractive and kin-based by WEIRD standards. This may limit China’s future growth as a global power.

The point is that setting a good example can do a lot more good than people think. This puts today’s nationalists and economic protectionists in an awkward position. They are not the future. They are throwbacks to an impoverished, unhappy past.

The post-1800 Great Enrichment that billions of people are enjoying today has deep and distant causes operating at multiple levels. Henrich’s thesis of WEIRD psychology, cultural openness, and economic prosperity will have a major impact on future work in geopolitics, economic development, political polling, immigration, and free trade for a long time to come.

Book Review: Eric Metaxas – Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy

Eric Metaxas – Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy  (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2010)

Who was Dietrich Bonhoeffer? He was a German pastor who became a prominent resistor to Hitler’s Third Reich. He helped people to escape Germany, was part of a group that plotted to assassinate Hitler, and died in a concentration camp.

This book would have been about two thirds shorter if it had stuck to its subject. Instead, much of the book is theological discourse. A hero’s courageous life story was regularly interrupted with digressions on obscure theological interpretations and debates—including an out-of-nowhere rant about abortion during a chapter on Bonoeffer’s time in Tegel prison.

Even while listening to the Audible narration at 2.25x speed, there was a great deal of tedium, and not enough about the remarkable man whose name is in the book’s title. There are occasional flashes of (possibly unintentional?) humor, as in Hitler’s description as an “irascible vegetarian.” These moments are few, though.

Bonhoeffer was born in 1906 into a prosperous, intellectual household with several siblings, including a twin sister. His childhood was happy, his parents raised him right, and Bonhoeffer showed high character from the start. He also had enough musical talent to seriously consider becoming a professional musician.

He instead decided to become a pastor. He received his doctorate at age 21, and was ordained at 25. Though protestant, he was tolerant of other denominations, including Catholics, making friends and attending their services. Bonhoeffer’s ecumenicism made him stand out as a little bit of a liberal hippie type by the standards of the day, though a straight-laced one.

The young Bonhoeffer also had an adventurous spirit. He traveled to Rome and Spain, though he spent much of those trips attending church services and in theological study. He was also able to spend a great deal of time studying his favorite sculpture, Laocoön and His Sons, located in the Vatican.

While on a trip to America, Bonhoeffer took a 4,000-mile road trip from New York to Mexico. Bonhoeffer did not know how to drive, and failed a driving test right before the trip. He drove anyway, though with a friend, and essentially taught himself on America’s highways.

During this period he read Erich Maria Remarque’s anti-war novel All Quiet on the Western Front and saw its movie adaptation. To that point, it was the 20th century’s best-selling novel. Bonhoeffer lost an older brother during World War I, and Remarque’s frank depictions of things his older brother experienced, and the way he humanized the soldiers, helped to turn Bonhoeffer into a pacifist.

Bonhoeffer and his similarly liberal-minded family were disturbed by Hitler’s rise from well before he took power, but didn’t take him very seriously until it was too late. But the problems were far larger than one man.

A German Christian movement arose in Germany, embracing the trendy new nationalism and supporting Hitler. Bonhoeffer denounced the movement—which did not come naturally to the inclusive Bonhoeffer—and began to earn a higher profile, and the attention of the authorities. In a theological distinction that actually mattered, Bonhoeffer argued that Hitler was converting the German Christians, not the other way around.

He also struggled with depression, starting around the mid-1930s. In 1939, before the war started in September, Bonhoeffer managed to escape Germany and return to America. But he was restless and unhappy, because he knew that he could help the resistance. So he ended up going back to Germany. He would not survive the war.

He joined the Abwehr, an underground resistance group that ultimately aimed to assassinate Hitler. They nearly succeeded several times, most famously in the failed Valkyrie plot. They also whisked away Jews and others to safety outside Germany, and tried to communicate clandestinely with Allied governments.

Bonhoeffer took seven trips over the Swiss border and back helping the Abwehr cause. He was imprisoned in 1943, just seven miles from his parents’ house. He also became engaged to an 18-year old, though he was 36 at this point. They wrote each other frequently, but saw each other in person a total of 17 times during his imprisonment. As the tide of the war turned against Germany, they both believed Bonhoeffer would spend a year in prison at most.

They were not far off. In February 1945, Bonhoeffer was transferred to the Buchenwald concentration camp, site of some of the Nazis’ worst medical experiment atrocities. He was hanged on April 9, 1945. Allied forces liberated the camp two days later. He was 39. Bonhoeffer’s Letters from Prison were published posthumously, and remain in print today.

Book Review: Tim Mackintosh-Smith – Arabs: A 3,000-Year History of Peoples, Tribes and Empires

Tim Mackintosh-Smith – Arabs: A 3,000-Year History of Peoples, Tribes and Empires

A very good survey history written by an Oxford-educated Brit who has lived in Yemen for much of his adult life. This book is especially interesting when read with Azar Gat’s thesis on nationalism in mind. Gat is worth summarizing to better understand Mackintosh-Smith. Gat views nationalism as both ancient and based on ethnicity. Ethnicity, for Gat, is broader than race or genetics, though it includes both of those things. Ethnicities share, in varying degrees, things like language, culture, religion, dress, dietary customs, and more. The list is long, and it can vary, though language is often the most important. The common thread is that taken together, these cultural markers are strong enough to band people together in an in-group that is easy to distinguish from out-groups.

Ethnicities are similar to the small tribal groups our species has lived in for nearly its entire 200,000-year span, just larger in scale. Nation-states, which are historically a very recent concept—just a few centuries old in most of the world—are an additional step up in scale. They are simply one more way for our evolutionarily-ingrained sense of ethnicity to express itself. A lot of today’s nationalism-related troubles are due to square political pegs not fitting into round cultural or in-group holes, which are always moving around and changing shape anyway.

With Gat’s framework in mind, Mackintosh-Smith’s affectionately argued thesis in this book suddenly makes a lot of sense. To Mackintosh-Smith, Arabs are simultaneously among the world’s most unified and its most fractious peoples. They have the Arabic language in common—Gat’s most important unifying ingredient. People in Morocco, Syria, Iraq, Tajikistan, and as far East as Pakistan can all speak to each other in Arabic and have little trouble understanding each other. But High Arabic is also a bit like Latin was in post-Roman Europe: a formal, stilted lingua franca. Many Arabs speak a different local language at home and in everyday life. So Arabs are at the same time united by language, and not.

Arabs also have Islam in common. But the Sunni-Shia split still has echoes today, and sets Shi’ite Iran apart from most other Arab Islamic countries. Just as Christianity has its million and one different flavors of Catholicism, Protestantism, Evangelicalism, and Orthodoxy, Islam has its different flavors of Sufism, Wahabbism, and on down the line, each with ancient, modern, moderate, and radical versions. So Arabs are at the same time united by Islam, and not.

One thing most Arabs have in common is a nomadic heritage. This has made imposing the new convention of national boundaries very difficult, if not impossible. Not only do some people still move across the new boundaries with some mixture of indifference and impunity, the very notion of national boundaries is a very new concept in Arabs’ 3,000-year history. So Arabs are at the same time united by their nomadic history, and divided by it.

Also in the mix is a cultural divide between the few remaining nomads and the now-majority city dwellers, and there is another ingredient in the unified-but-not mix.

Mackintosh-Smith, though likely unfamiliar with Gat’s work on nationalism, is aware of all those competing dynamics. At each stage of his chronological narrative, most of those facets of Arabic life are there, from the establishment of settled agriculture to pre-Islamic empires, to Muhammad himself and the Ummayad caliphate, its succeeding Abbasid caliphate, its eventual displacement by the Ottomans, and on to today’s independent states, unity and discord are always there in tension with each other. It is a fascinating story.

More Interconnected than Most People Think

From page 70 of Johan Norberg’s 2020 book, Open: The Story of Human Progress:

What we now think of as Western civilization is a combination of a philosophical heritage from the Greeks, religions from the Middle East, creatively interpreted by Romans in what is now Turkey, and scientific ideas borrowed from the Arabs and the Chinese. We got our alphabets from the Phoenicians, and our numbers are called ‘Arabic numerals’ because we learned them from mathematicians in Baghdad, who got them from the Indians.

New EU Tech Rules will Chill Innovation and Harm Consumers

This is a press statement originally posted at cei.org.

The European Union today announced new rules it claims will change the way technology companies operate. The EU says the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act “will create a safer digital space for users” and “level the playing field so that digital businesses can grow.”

Vice President for Strategy Iain Murray said:

“The European Union’s proposed new powers allow it to treat American tech firms as cash cows, to be fined whenever it finds them guilty of providing too much discretion to consumers or allowing too much speech. Its proposed veto on acquisitions will also chill innovation in the European tech sector as it will make the prospect of significant rewards for an acquisition-based business strategy less likely. Europe will act as an anchor on tech innovation, slowing progress and reducing consumer welfare worldwide. The incoming Biden administration should avoid making the same mistakes.”

Senior Fellow Ryan Young said:

“The European Union’s two proposed tech regulation bills have two fatal flaws. One is that, on purpose or not, they are trade protectionism under another name. Many of their provisions are aimed at the large U.S. tech companies. Taking them down a notch would give an opening to EU-based tech companies, the thinking goes. As with President Trump’s trade wars, this will harm consumers without actually helping the industry. The two bills also leave in place the EU’s stifling regulatory culture that is the root cause of Europe’s lack of tech sector innovation.

“The second fatal flaw is that the EU’s proposals would actually lock in the existing American firms’ dominance. They are the only companies that can afford the massive content moderation costs the EU is demanding, or the large fines. Startups that might one day dethrone today’s giants cannot afford these costs, and may not even bother trying to compete.”

Read more:

Book Review: Philip Freeman – Celtic Mythology: Tales of Gods, Goddesses, and Heroes

Philip Freeman – Celtic Mythology: Tales of Gods, Goddesses, and Heroes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

An entertaining collection of retold Celtic myths. I listened to the Audible version. Freeman offers some historical and cultural analysis to go along with the stories. The added context makes it easier to appreciate stories with cultural norms very different from ours. It also puts them in proper historical context, mostly stretching across a period stretching from Ireland and Britain’s time at the periphery of the Roman Empire up until Northern Europe’s economic revival around the time of Charlemagne.

The cultural and textual similarities to Nordic myths and Icelandic sagas was surprising. They are both very violent. Women are relegated to the sidelines, but occasionally flash independence and deviousness. And they are clearly honor and kin-based cultures. This was more for fun than for research for me, but there is plenty there at both levels.

Then again, during this period and after, as Michael Pye argues in The Edge of the World, the areas ringing the North Sea were almost their own distinct civilization, just as was the Mediterranean region to the south. The sea connected the British Isles to what is now northern France and Germany and the Lower Countries, whose traders would later form the Hanseatic League. Norway and Sweden were on the eastern edge of this ring. And Iceland was settled by their more adventurous sailors, and brought their language, customs, and stories with them. The Celtic tradition Freeman shares is distinct, but also part of this larger whole.

Book Review: Ben Wilson – Metropolis: A History of the City, Humankind’s Greatest Invention

Ben Wilson – Metropolis: A History of the City, Humankind’s Greatest Invention (New York: Doubleday, 2020).

A wide-ranging world history told through the lens of cities. Wilson bounces around between Asia, Europe, and America, and concludes in Lagos, Nigeria, which is well on its way to becoming one of the world’s major urban centers. Wilson feels at home discussing subjects as diverse as the Epic of Gilgamesh and its relationship to Uruk, the first big city; coffeehouse culture in 18th century London, with its undercurrents of political dissent and rebellion against social norms; the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and their fast but difficult recovery; and the birth of skyscrapers in jazz age New York and the dashed grand plans for remaking social orders in glass and steel. For a Brit, he is also surprisingly well-versed in the early history of hip-hop.

Wilson is a cheerful tour guide and has a conversational prose style that reads quickly. Metropolis would go well with any number of books, ranging from James C. Scott’s Against the Grain about the close relationship between early agriculture, the first cities, and the first governments; Monica Smith’s very similar Cities: The First 6,000 Years; and The Death and Life of Great American Cities by Jane Jacobs, the influential urban economist who took on Robert Moses’ machine politics in New York City in the mid-twentieth century.

Book Review: Muhammad Yunus – Banker To The Poor: Micro-Lending and the Battle Against World Poverty

Muhammad Yunus – Banker To The Poor: Micro-Lending and the Battle Against World Poverty (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007)

Yunus is a Bangladeshi economist who did much to popularize microlending—small loans to budding entrepreneurs in the developing world. He won the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. This is his autobiography.

While his bottom-up approach to development is a massive improvement from the top-down model favored by economists such as Jeffrey Sachs and organizations like the World Bank, Yunus is not without his critics, and was touched by scandal in recent years. Now 80 years old, he is mostly retired.

Though not entirely objective, this is a good introduction to how a creative, entrepreneurial approach can have a large positive impact on philanthropy and economic development. There are lots of ways to cook an egg. Yunus’ recipe is one of many that are not perfect, but are still part of a healthy diet.

Further reforms must operate not just in finance or in this or that policy area, but also at the institutional level, such as property rights protections, and in culture, such as a general sense that openness, innovation, and commerce are good things, and corruption should be resisted, rather than tolerated.