This Week in Ridiculous Regulations

The House passed a $1.85 trillion spending bill, which a 50-50 Senate will now consider. An Alzheimer’s vaccine began human trials. If it proves safe and effective, we will then find out how many years the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will withhold it from patients. Hopefully the FDA learned the right lesson from its expedited approval of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines. Meanwhile, agencies issued new rules ranging from date taxes to refractory products.

On to the data:

  • Agencies issued 63 final regulations last week, after 52 the previous week.
  • That’s the equivalent of a new regulation every two hours and 40 minutes.
  • With 2,865 final regulations so far in 2021, agencies are on pace to issue 3,301 final regulations this year. 2020’s total was 3,218 final regulations.
  • Agencies issued 41 proposed regulations in the Federal Register last week, after 34 the previous week.
  • With 1,851 proposed regulations so far in 2021, agencies are on pace to issue 2,132 proposed regulations this year. 2020’s total was 2,222 proposed regulations.
  • Agencies published 391 notices last week, after 343 notices the previous week.
  • With 19,725 notices so far in 2021, agencies are on pace to issue 22,725 notices this year. 2020’s total was 22,480.
  • Last week, 3,255 new pages were added to the Federal Register, after 1,225 pages the previous week.
  • The average Federal Register issue this year contains 299 pages.
  • With 66,150 pages so far, the 2021 Federal Register is on pace for 76,210 pages in 2021. The 2020 total was 87,352 pages. The all-time record adjusted page count (subtracting skips, jumps, and blank pages) is 96,994, set in 2016.
  • Rules are called “economically significant” if they have costs of $100 million or more in a given year. There are 21 such rules so far in 2021, three from the last week. Agencies published five economically significant rules in 2020, and four in 2019.
  • The running cost tally for 2021’s economically significant rules ranges from $6.72 billion to $11.61 billion. The 2020 figure ranges from net savings of between $2.04 billion and $5.69 billion, mostly from estimated savings on federal spending. The exact numbers depend on discount rates and other assumptions.
  • Agencies have published 331 final rules meeting the broader definition of “significant” in 2021, with four in the last week. This is on pace for 381 significant rules in 2021. 2020’s total was 79 significant final rules.
  • In 2021, 789 new rules affect small businesses; 84 are classified as significant. 2020’s totals were 668 rules affecting small businesses, 26 of them significant.

Highlights from last week’s new regulations:

For more data, see Ten Thousand Commandments and follow @10KC and @RegoftheDay on Twitter.

Court Strikes Down Trump Tariff: Precedent for Institution-Level Changes?

Pessimism reigns for trade liberalization in the short run, but there is fresh hope for the long run. A new court decision over solar panel tariffs shows why. Reason’s Eric Boehm’s headline sums it up: “A Judge Just Did What Biden Wouldn’t: Dump Some Trump Tariffs.” This is good news, but it gets better.

The decision’s importance isn’t about the solar panel tariffs themselves. It’s about the separation of powers. And political institutions, such as the separation of powers, are what drive trade policy in the long run—not adjustments to this or that tariff rate. The rules of the game determine how it is played. Those rules have been out of whack for some time, and presidents have been abusing them. That could start to change if this precedent were to influence other cases.

In short, the court ruled that the executive branch overstepped its tariff-making authority, so it partially negated some solar panel tariffs that President Trump enacted without congressional input. Most readers know that Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution states that only Congress has taxing authority. The Constitution grants the president no such powers.

There is some history behind why the president was still able to unilaterally enact tariffs without congressional input. This context is important for understanding why trade policy has become so dysfunctional and which institution-level changes will be most effective in reforming it.

In the mid-20th century, Congress wanted to pass large-scale tariff relief, but was systematically incapable of doing so. Nearly every tariff had its own special interest in some member’s district defending it. So even though almost everyone agreed that tariff relief as a whole is good policy, they couldn’t it done. Hundreds of small exemptions added up quickly, and trade reform bills became so watered down as to become useless.

Worse, tariff liberalizations were necessary to meet requirements under the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was founded in the aftermath of World War II, and was the predecessor to the World Trade Organization (WTO). GATT was established in part to preserve peace after the horrors of World War II; countries that trade seldom go to war. It was also established as a way to undo the U.S. Smoot-Hawley tariffs and foreign retaliatory tariffs that had reduced foreign trade by two thirds and left it clogged with paperwork and corruption.

The solution to this special interest sludge, Congress believed, was to outsource tariff policy to the president. The thinking was that the president represented the country as a whole, rather than small slices of constituents, and so would be less prone to lobbyists’ pleas. So, the 1962 Trade Expansion Act and the 1974 Trade Act both contained provisions granting the president the authority to unilaterally impose tariffs under certain conditions without a vote in Congress.

It didn’t work. Tariffs did go down over time, but those provisions had little to do with it. They were almost entirely dormant until the Trump administration. And instead of using them to lower tariffs, Trump used them to raise them—eventually doubling America’s average tariff rate in about three years.

This week’s court decision said that the Trump administration overstepped its bounds on a solar panel tariff it imposed under Section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act, which lets the president enact tariffs to protect domestic industries from foreign competition.

It is a narrow ruling that affects only one of the three major tariff-making provisions—and the least-used one at that. Much the bigger fish are Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, a national security provision that was invoked for the steel and aluminum tariffs, and Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, a treaty violation provision that was invoked for the China tariffs.

But this week’s court decision sets a precedent. Again, what is important isn’t what the ruling does to solar panel tariff rates, though any tariff relief is welcome. What is important is what the ruling means for institutions, such as the separation of powers. Iain Murray and I have been arguing for years that tariff reform depends on restoring a healthier separation of powers. For a long time, the executive branch has been too powerful relative to Congress. And the problem gets worse with each new administration, regardless of which party is in power.

Which leads to a bit of bad news. The Biden administration actually defended the Trump administration’s position in the case. Politicians rarely argue to reduce their own powers, and that’s what this case is really about.

It is also bad news that President Biden is seemingly allergic to tariff reform. Even a modest reform like resetting tariffs to 2017 levels would help unclog supply networks while lowering consumer prices during a time of high inflation. It’s as close to a win-win as there is in politics—helping the economy and making the other party look bad at the same time. But Biden isn’t doing it. He is even airing new proposals, such as carbon tariffs, that are essentially Trump-era trade policies in green packaging. And if he needs to, he might try to do it without Congress having a say.

Even with a court victory, the short run still looks bad for trade policy. The Trump tariffs should now be called the Trump-Biden tariffs. The Biden administration is also delaying or ignoring other important facets of trade policy, including trade agreements with the United Kingdom and European Union, rebuilding the WTO, and rejoining the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is carrying on without American involvement.

Any significant positive move on trade policy is likely years away, but this week’s court decision gives some hope for the long run. That is because policies, in the long run, do not depend on changing this or that tariff rate. They depend on institutions. The more we can chip away at executive power and contain taxing power to the legislative branch, where it belongs, the better off we will be. This is just a baby step, but as every parent knows, baby steps lead to good things.

Review of Michael Munger, The Sharing Economy: Its Pitfalls and Promises (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2021)

Transaction costs are one of the most overlooked ideas in economics. They are also one of the most important. The lowering of transaction costs is an engine of modernity itself and key to understanding where future progress might take us. That is Duke University economist Michael Munger’s argument in his new book, The Sharing Economy: Its Pitfalls and Promises (free download from the Institute of Economic Affairs). It follows up his 2018 book, Tomorrow 3.0.

What are transaction costs? As the name implies, they are things that get in the way of making transactions. Think of them as economic friction. Things like waiting in line, searching for a product, comparing prices, driving to and from a store, or resetting another forgotten website password. Transaction costs often cannot be measured in money, but they are still part of the price of everything we buy. A good economist knows, money is not everything.

Countless beneficial transactions never happen because the time and hassle required outweigh the benefits. Successful entrepreneurs can make these lost transactions come to life just by lowering their attendant transaction costs. In a way, they succeed by making the invisible visible. Along the way, they can create new industries, revolutionize existing industries, and topple old ones. Transaction costs are the hidden engine of Joseph Schumpeter’s creative destruction.

Munger’s dissertation advisor was the Nobel laureate Douglass North, one of the pioneers of transaction cost economics, along with other laureates such as Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson. Munger likes to tell a story about North explaining that, while there are endless questions to ask in economics, many of them have the same answer: transaction costs. Over the years, North’s advice has proved useful to countless graduate students in search of thesis topics. As The Sharing Economy shows, there remains plenty of uncharted territory. Today’s graduate students should take note—as should experienced scholars.

How do transaction costs apply to the new sharing economy? Broken down to fundamentals, Uber doesn’t sell taxi rides or food delivery. It sells access to a platform that drastically lowers transaction costs for some services. The product is the platform. Yes, people use it to buy and sell taxi rides and food delivery, but they could use that type of platform for almost anything.

This is why a lot of sharing economy startups describe themselves as the Uber or the Airbnb for this or that service. They’re selling transaction cost savings, not whatever product or service appears in their marketing materials.

Every transaction requires what Munger calls the three Ts: triangulation, transfer, and trust. Sharing platforms can solve the three Ts quickly and cheaply:

  • Triangulation means coordinating everyone involved in the transaction. In a food delivery transaction, those are the customer, the restaurant, and the delivery driver. Until recently, solving this coordination problem was so difficult that most restaurants did not offer delivery at all. And the ones that did had to hire their own drivers to work exclusively for them. Unless business was both brisk and consistent, this was a risky proposition. Today, sharing platforms can solve triangulation problems in seconds. As a result, restaurants that might not be able to afford full-time delivery staff can now share drivers with other businesses and earn additional sales, while customers gain additional choices.
  • Transfer means making sure everyone gets paid. Uber, for example, has all parties’ payment info stored in the app. It automatically charges customers the right amount, pays restaurants and drivers, and handles tips. That is far easier than in the old days of cash, checks, or reading out your credit card number over the phone.
  • Trust is all parties having confidence that everything will go as it should. This is what ratings systems contribute. Riders can avoid drivers with low ratings and drivers can avoid problem customers. They can do this in seconds just by glancing at their ratings. On the other side of the coin, high ratings can be lucrative for vendors, giving them a greater incentive to keep customers happy than a traditional cab driver. And keeping that five-star rating can encourage more civil behavior from customers. It doesn’t pay to be a Karen.

Sharing economy platforms solve the three Ts so quickly and easily that millions of transactions that would never have happened a decade ago are now routine. This, for Munger, is a reason for optimism. Similar platforms could emerge for all kinds of goods. In fact, they probably are doing so right now in a dorm room or a garage somewhere.

Tools that spend nearly all of their time in storage could be rented out, for example. Other possibilities include office equipment, professional-grade audio and video equipment, and designer clothing. Some of these ideas might be successful. Others might be duds. People will likely find out soon enough.

Munger believes the low-transaction cost sharing economy could transform manufacturing as we know it. Factories would make far fewer goods, and what they do make would tend to be professional grade and more durable. A drill that spends 30 years in someone’s garage might get a couple hours of use over its entire lifespan, but if it’s shared, it will get far more use on a wider variety of tasks. It will need to be more solidly built and easily repaired.

That is one reason why the sharing economy has costs, as well as benefits. Both words in the phrase “creative destruction” are important. Just because the benefits outweigh the costs doesn’t mean costs do not exist. Manufacturing jobs have already declined by about a third since their 1979 peak, from about 18 million workers to about 12 million. If sharing platforms become popular for a lot of goods, that decline will be deeper and steeper. At the same time, the higher-grade goods still being made might require more skills or more automation to make, displacing less skilled workers.

Other jobs would open up in warehousing and delivery, and likely in other sectors. Munger doesn’t know what these might be, and neither does anyone else. Some of these jobs might not be appealing, might not pay as well, or may not work with some workers’ family responsibilities or other personal situations.

On the other hand, the size of the labor force has stayed remarkably consistent relative to population  throughout America’s transition from agriculture to industry, and from industry to services. While the inability to predict the future is scary, that’s no reason to keep things as they are. As Munger says on page 89, “Platforms are disruptive, but outlawing disruption has never worked.”

Transaction Costs and a Policy Revolution

As transaction cost reductions transform the economy, they also transform public policy. The problem is that public policy usually takes long to catch up. Regulations classify many workers as either employees or contractors, and treat them differently. Employee status comes with certain rules for minimum wages, benefits, and working conditions, while the rules for contractors are generally looser. It is also a false dichotomy that poorly fits workers’ needs.

If an accountant uses a platform like Taskrabbit to work for several clients, is she an employee of any of them? Does she count as Taskrabbit’s employee because it handles her payments or is she a customer who pays to access its platform? Does it matter if she commutes to an office or works from home? What if she’d rather choose her own health insurance or retirement plan? My colleague Iain Murray explored this question in his 2016 CEI paper “Punching the Clock on a Smartphone App.”

Current regulations don’t have good answers to these questions. And laws like California’s AB5 gig worker law and the proposed PRO Act at the federal level would entrench the legacy labor law model even further. All this is because some entrepreneurs thought of a way to use smartphone apps to reduce transaction costs.

In the age of COVID, sharing platforms have made it easier for workers to avoid public transportation and crowded offices. When COVID subsides, many workers will still prefer to avoid commutes and offices in favor of more pleasant surroundings like home offices, coffee shops, or smaller shared offices—which some sharing platforms offer. Regulators should think carefully before they take those options away.

Antitrust policy is in the middle of its own revolution, thanks in part to transaction costs. Sharing platforms are just another version of the old make-or-buy decision. If a company needs legal help, does it use in-house counsel or hire an outside attorney? Should a firm employ its own custodian or hire a cleaning service? The answer depends on transaction costs. If it’s cheaper to do something yourself, do that. If transacting with someone else costs less, do that. The answer is different for every company—and can change over time within a company. Sharing platforms and their lower transaction costs provide new possible answers to this age-old problem.

As of this writing, the leading food delivery platforms are DoorDash, UberEats, and GrubHub. They could buy out smaller competitors or merge with each other in the coming years, which might result in antitrust action. It shouldn’t, and transaction costs explain why.

A restaurant that wants to offer delivery has a make-or-buy decision to make. Does it hire its own driver or outsource to a sharing platform? It will go with whichever has lower transaction costs. This provides a built-in competitive check on sharing platforms that will never go away—even if one sharing platform monopolizes the entire market. If its fees cost more than the restaurant hiring its own drivers, then restaurants will opt for the latter. Several restaurants in the same city could even band together and jointly hire a driver—if regulations allow them.

The reason people use sharing platforms in the first place is because their transaction costs are lower than the alternatives. And the alternative of doing something in-house will never go away. Sharing platforms do not have market power, and never will.

Sharing platforms also do not restrain trade, which is another threshold for antitrust enforcement. They enable new trades that would never have happened otherwise, because they lower transaction costs. Before sharing apps, food delivery options in most places were limited to pizza and Chinese. Now, everyone from McDonald’s to mom-and-pop diners offer delivery. Some restaurants, such as Panda Express, are even attempting to undercut sharing platforms by creating their own app-based ordering services to avoid platforms’ fees.

Transaction Costs and the Moral Economy

Contrary to popular belief, morals are an integral part of economics. One of the discipline’s founding works, after all, is Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. Man is an animal that trades, to paraphrase from Smith’s other great work, The Wealth of Nations. People want to exchange, cooperate, and compete. It is our nature. But transaction costs get in the way of our nature, because they get in the way of trade.

Economists Virgil Storr and Ginni Choi, of the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, argue in their book Do Markets Corrupt Our Morals? that markets are moral playgrounds. When people enter those playgrounds, they learn how to trust and earn trust. They learn to keep their word and be polite—the late, great Steve Horwitz delighted in the “double thank you” that accompanies most transactions. People on the playground learn that the best way to get something you value is to give others things they value even more.

These are skills that take practice and repetition to develop. Transaction costs raise the cost of this moral practice. And when something costs more, people consume less of it.

If the goal is an open, civil society, then transaction cost reduction should be an important priority. Sharing economy platforms have the potential to do exactly that on a massive scale. At the same time, they are just another chapter in a long story, and hardly the final one.

Munger, by taking Douglass North’s advice, has used an old and overlooked tool to better understand new technologies and emerging economic changes. Sharing platforms have already changed the way people take cab rides, order food, and go on vacation. In the coming years, they could reshape the manufacturing sector, office culture, and even urban design, if traditional offices and downtowns continue to fall out of favor.

Transaction costs can also lead to fresh insights about labor regulations, antitrust, and other areas of public policy, as well as the overlooked symbiosis of markets and morality. Though The Sharing Economy is geared to a British audience, American readers will still get far more value from this freely downloadable book than they spend in transaction costs. While this admittedly sets a low bar, I intend it as high praise. I could not recommend this book more highly.

Download The Sharing Economy for free from IEA’s website here.

This Week in Ridiculous Regulations

It was a four-day week for the Federal Register in honor of Veterans Day. In the news, inflation reached a 30-year high, President Biden signed a trillion-dollar infrastructure bill into law, and a United States senator got his feathers in a bunch over Big Bird’s vaccination status. Agencies issued new rules ranging from turtle excluder devices to the United Soybean Board.

On to the data:

  • Agencies issued 52 final regulations last week, after 63 the previous week.
  • That’s the equivalent of a new regulation every two hours and 14 minutes.
  • With 2,750 final regulations so far in 2021, agencies are on pace to issue 3,228 final regulations this year. 2020’s total was 3,218 final regulations.
  • Agencies issued 34 proposed regulations in the Federal Register last week, after 33 the previous week.
  • With 1,810 proposed regulations so far in 2021, agencies are on pace to issue 2,085 proposed regulations this year. 2020’s total was 2,222 proposed regulations.
  • Agencies published 343 notices last week, after 495 notices the previous week.
  • With 19,254 notices so far in 2021, agencies are on pace to issue 22,182 notices this year. 2020’s total was 22,480.
  • Last week, 1,225 new pages were added to the Federal Register, after 1,505 pages the previous week.
  • The average Federal Register issue this year contains 291 pages.
  • With 62,891 pages so far, the 2021 Federal Register is on pace for 72,455 pages in 2021. The 2020 total was 87,352 pages. The all-time record adjusted page count (subtracting skips, jumps, and blank pages) is 96,994, set in 2016.
  • Rules are called “economically significant” if they have costs of $100 million or more in a given year. There are 18 such rules so far in 2021, two from the last week. Agencies published five economically significant rules in 2020, and four in 2019.
  • The running cost tally for 2021’s economically significant rules ranges from $5.42 billion to $9.26 billion. The 2020 figure ranges from net savings of between $2.04 billion and $5.69 billion, mostly from estimated savings on federal spending. The exact numbers depend on discount rates and other assumptions.
  • Agencies have published 353 final rules meeting the broader definition of “significant” in 2021, with four in the last week. This is on pace for 407 significant rules in 2021. 2020’s total was 79 significant final rules.
  • In 2021, 773 new rules affect small businesses; 89 are classified as significant. 2020’s totals were 668 rules affecting small businesses, 26 of them significant.

Highlights from last week’s new regulations:

For more data, see Ten Thousand Commandments and follow @10KC and @RegoftheDay on Twitter.

On the Radio: Inflation

Earlier this week I was on the Lars Larson show to talk about inflation. The audio is here.

I also appeared on the Dave Elswick show on the same topic. The audio is here, starting around five minutes in.

Inflation Hits High Mark with Consumer Price Climb in October 2021, but Policymakers Can Take Steps to Help: CEI Statement

This statement originally appeared at cei.org.

Bad news for consumers – prices rose 0.9 percent in October and to a 30-year high, according to data released today by the Labor Department. CEI Senior Fellow Ryan Young explains ways policymakers can help tamp down on inflation:

“Inflation increased yet again. Inflation is what happens when the supply of money grows faster than the supply of goods and services. The goal is to keep their growth roughly in sync. There are two things policymakers can do to help restore the balance.

“One is for the Federal Reserve to tighten up the money supply. While it has said it will do this starting next year, it will face heavy political pressure to keep it loose. Tighter money makes government debt more expensive to pay back, and already-record deficit spending is becoming worse with the infrastructure and social spending bills. Politicians also push for looser money when elections draw near. A series of high-level vacancies at the Fed will create opportunities to pack the Fed with officials who will do what the administration wants. This is not good news for tamping down inflation from the monetary side.

“The second way to fight inflation is to boost the supply of goods and services. Policymakers can help by removing trade restrictions and other regulations that are sludging up supply networks, and by easing occupational licenses, permit requirements, zoning and land-use regulations, and other barriers that discourage people from working. COVID remains a wild card. More vaccinations will help, but if another variant emerges, people will be reluctant to continue opening up.”

This Week in Ridiculous Regulations

Children can now receive COVID-19 vaccinations, which is good news all around. The economy gained 531,000 jobs in October, showing once again why Congress’ big spending bills are unnecessary. Meanwhile, pundits spent the week analyzing off-year election results. Agencies issued new rules ranging from rural innovation to seafood dealers.

On to the data:

  • Agencies issued 63 final regulations last week, after 58 the previous week.
  • That’s the equivalent of a new regulation every two hours and 40 minutes.
  • With 2,750 final regulations so far in 2021, agencies are on pace to issue 3,243 final regulations this year. 2020’s total was 3,218 final regulations.
  • Agencies issued 33 proposed regulations in the Federal Register last week, after 61 the previous week.
  • With 1,776 proposed regulations so far in 2021, agencies are on pace to issue 2,094 proposed regulations this year. 2020’s total was 2,222 proposed regulations.
  • Agencies published 495 notices last week, after 418 notices the previous week.
  • With 18,911 notices so far in 2021, agencies are on pace to issue 22,301 notices this year. 2020’s total was 22,480.
  • Last week, 1,505 new pages were added to the Federal Register, after 1,394 pages the previous week.
  • The average Federal Register issue this year contains 291 pages.
  • With 61,664 pages so far, the 2021 Federal Register is on pace for 72,717 pages in 2021. The 2020 total was 87,352 pages. The all-time record adjusted page count (subtracting skips, jumps, and blank pages) is 96,994, set in 2016.
  • Rules are called “economically significant” if they have costs of $100 million or more in a given year. There are 16 such rules so far in 2021, none from the last week. Agencies published five economically significant rules in 2020, and four in 2019.
  • The running cost tally for 2021’s economically significant rules ranges from $4.61 billion to $8.40 billion. The 2020 figure ranges from net savings of between $2.04 billion and $5.69 billion, mostly from estimated savings on federal spending. The exact numbers depend on discount rates and other assumptions.
  • Agencies have published 348 final rules meeting the broader definition of “significant” in 2021, with four in the last week. This is on pace for 410 significant rules in 2021. 2020’s total was 79 significant final rules.
  • In 2021, 761 new rules affect small businesses; 88 are classified as significant. 2020’s totals were 668 rules affecting small businesses, 26 of them significant.

Highlights from last week’s new regulations:

For more data, see Ten Thousand Commandments and follow @10KC and @RegoftheDay on Twitter.

How to Fill 10 Million Vacant Jobs

Would raising the minimum wage help to fill the more than 10 million job vacancies currently open? It makes some intuitive sense—higher pay will attract more workers. The trouble is that minimum wages have tradeoffs that cancel out that higher pay, so it wouldn’t work. As I explain in an op-ed for Inside Sources:

Workers earn more than wages. They also earn non-wage pay. If the law requires employers to raise wages, they can and do make up the difference by cutting non-wage pay. …

Restaurant workers, for example, might lose complimentary shift meals. Customers might leave smaller tips if they believe their server is getting a higher hourly wage. A restaurant owner might decide not to hire busboys and instead ask servers to add those duties to their already full plates. Retail workers might have to pay for formerly free parking, have fewer or shorter breaks, or lose employee discounts or tuition assistance.

Some employees might get their hours cut (an obvious tradeoff for which recent Nobel laureate David Card’s famous co-authored study failed to account).

Minimum wages don’t work as intended, but there is still a lot that policy makers can do to help get people back into the workforce. They should loosen job-killing occupational licenses, reform zoning and land-use regulations that inflate rents that could instead go to paying salaries, reform financial regulations that make it difficult for companies to hire and grow, and undo Trump-era trade barriers that are sludging up supply networks.

Read the whole piece here. See also my CEI study, “Minimum Wages Have Tradeoffs.”

Steel, Aluminum Tariffs to Remain Above Pre-Trump Levels

It is not asking much to undo President Trump’s doubling of U.S. tariffs, which are a major contributor to today’s supply network crisis. But apparently even this is asking too much from an administration that largely shares Trump’s economic views. While the weekend’s news about the easing of steel and aluminum tariffs against the European Union was welcome, it is too small to do much good. Nor does it treat root problems.

The tariffs will actually remain in place. The U.S. will simply allow 3.3 million metric tons of EU-made steel into the U.S. duty-free before charging tariffs. For context, U.S. producers made 72 million metric tons of steel in 2020, so the exemption will have only a small effect on steel prices. Shipments beyond 3.3 million metric tons will still be charged a 25 percent tariff. In addition, the EU agreed to not enact new retaliatory tariffs that were scheduled to take effect on December 2.

Not imposing new tariffs is different from lowering existing ones. It also has a much effect. Under the new agreement, all other existing trade barriers will remain in place. Total U.S.-EU trade barriers will remain higher than they were four years ago. This is bad news for consumers and producers on both sides of the Atlantic, at a time when prices are rising and supply networks are strained.

The agreement even adds new trade restrictions where there were none before. The New York Times reports:

The agreement will also place restrictions on products that are finished in Europe but use steel from China, Russia, South Korea, and other countries. To qualify for duty-free treatment, steel products must be entirely made in the European Union.

Tariffs mean higher prices. The new exemption’s small size means that steel and aluminum prices will remain above pre-tariff levels. Cars, construction, and other steel-using industries will continue to have shortages and higher consumer prices.

The exemption will also do little to relieve strained supply networks. For example, there is now a shortage of truck trailers, called chassis, used for hauling shipping containers to and from ports. Chinese-made chassis are currently subject to 220 percent tariffs, which makes them unaffordable for many smaller trucking companies. Washington’s goal is to have them buy American-made chassis instead.

The trouble is that those tariffs also allow U.S. chassis producers to keep their prices high. They don’t have to worry about truckers turning to competitors—which is ironic in a time of rising antitrust enforcement. While that goes straight to the chassis makers’ profit margins, it harms everyone else. Ports stay clogged, truckers can’t do much to help unclog them, and consumers face higher prices and shortages. About the only winners are domestic steel producers and their labor unions, which is likely the point.

The U.S.-EU trade dispute also remains unresolved. This agreement is more of a cease-fire. A law of tariffs, rediscovered during the Trump era, is that other countries nearly always retaliate in kind against new tariffs. What happened here is that the U.S. is partially rolling back one of its new tariffs, and the EU is rolling back its retaliation. Nothing has been liberalized on net. Other long-running disputes over aerospace subsidies and other issues remain in play.

COVID-19 is still hampering the economy and supply networks are still in crisis. Now would be a good time for actual trade liberalization, rather than merely preventing another round of protectionist escalation. But on trade, as with many other issues, the Biden administration is difficult to tell apart from its predecessor.

This Week in Ridiculous Regulations

Third quarter GDP growth was an estimated at 2 percent, down from about 6 percent the previous two quarters. The 2021 Federal Register topped 60,000 pages with two months left in the year. Meanwhile, agencies issued new rules ranging from fan efficiency to motherships.

On to the data:

  • Agencies issued 58 final regulations last week, after 53 the previous week.
  • That’s the equivalent of a new regulation every two hours and 54 minutes.
  • With 2,687 final regulations so far in 2021, agencies are on pace to issue 3,245 final regulations this year. 2020’s total was 3,218 final regulations.
  • Agencies issued 61 proposed regulations in the Federal Register last week, after 36 the previous week.
  • With 1,743 proposed regulations so far in 2021, agencies are on pace to issue 2,105 proposed regulations this year. 2020’s total was 2,222 proposed regulations.
  • Agencies published 418 notices last week, after 491 notices the previous week.
  • With 18,416 notices so far in 2021, agencies are on pace to issue 22,242 notices this year. 2020’s total was 22,480.
  • Last week, 1,394 new pages were added to the Federal Register, after 1,238 pages the previous week.
  • The average Federal Register issue this year contains 291 pages.
  • With 60,158 pages so far, the 2021 Federal Register is on pace for 72,655 pages in 2021. The 2020 total was 87,352 pages. The all-time record adjusted page count (subtracting skips, jumps, and blank pages) is 96,994, set in 2016.
  • Rules are called “economically significant” if they have costs of $100 million or more in a given year. There are 16 such rules so far in 2021, three from the last week. Agencies published five economically significant rules in 2020, and four in 2019.
  • The running cost tally for 2021’s economically significant rules ranges from $4.61 billion to $8.40 billion. The 2020 figure ranges from net savings of between $2.04 billion and $5.69 billion, mostly from estimated savings on federal spending. The exact numbers depend on discount rates and other assumptions.
  • Agencies have published 344 final rules meeting the broader definition of “significant” in 2021, with four in the last week. That is on pace for 415 significant rules in 2021. 2020’s total was 79 significant final rules.
  • In 2021, 734 new rules affect small businesses; 87 are classified as significant. 2020’s totals were 668 rules affecting small businesses, 26 of them significant.

Highlights from last week’s new regulations:

For more data, see Ten Thousand Commandments and follow @10KC and @RegoftheDay on Twitter.