Category Archives: Economics

Export-Import Bank Update

Things have been busy on the Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank front. For those not in the know, the Ex-Im Bank makes loans and guarantees loans for U.S. exporters, as well as their foreign customers. For example, if a foreign airline wants to buy a new plane, Ex-Im will arrange favorable financing terms if it buys that plane from U.S.-based Boeing.

Ex-Im’s critics argue that the bank is a corporate welfare program, and is vulnerable to favoritism and corruption. I compiled several reasons to oppose Ex-Im in this paper. Ex-Im’s defenders counter that Ex-Im is necessary to increase U.S. exports and support American jobs, though buying that argument requires ignoring that 98 percent of U.S. exports happen without Ex-Im’s involvement, and that there are other, possibly better uses for the capital Ex-Im sits on.

Unlike most other agencies, Ex-Im has a built-in sunset, meaning it will automatically cease to exist unless Congress periodically votes to renew its charter. This led to a bitter political fight last fall, when Ex-Im’s charter was renewed until this June 30. Typical reauthorizations last for four or five years, so this nine-month reauthorization was a significant concession to reformers. As June 30 approaches, the Ex-Im battle is heating up once again. At this point, it appears Congress will hold a vote in May on Ex-Im’s fate.

This week, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing, where Ex-Im head Fred Hochberg (see his written testimony here) defended his agency from Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), who wants to close the bank.

Also this week, the Justice Department charged former Ex-Im employee Johnny Gutierrez with bribery. Over the period 2006-2013, Gutierrez allegedly accepted $78,900 of cash and other improper gifts. Diane Katz recently unearthed 74 cases of alleged corruption among Ex-Im employees from 2009-14, an impressive achievement for an agency with only 400 employees.

As Ex-Im’s beneficiaries turn up the political heat, rumors are swirling that Republican House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.), who came out publicly against Ex-Im last year, is changing his mind and might favor reauthorization. Rep. Stephen Fincher (R-Tenn.), who is sponsoring an Ex-Im reauthorization bill, has been working on McCarthy for some time. Boeing, which alone accounts for nearly half of Ex-Im’s business, has spent $69 million on lobbying since 2012, much of it in support of Ex-Im, and is pressing very hard to keep Ex-Im’s doors open.

Delta Airlines has been the loudest corporate voice opposing Ex-Im, but it has only spent $10 million in lobbying since 2012, barely one seventh of Boeing’s total. Delta argues that Ex-Im subsidizes its foreign competitors when they buy Boeing jets, putting Delta, which pays full price for Boeing’s planes, at an artificial disadvantage.

Finally, the bank claims to be a champion of small business, but as a new Mercatus Center paper by Veronique de Rugy and Diane Katz shows, Ex-Im heavily favors big businesses over small businesses

At this point it’s hard to say how this fight will end. The economic case against Ex-Im is airtight, and many key members of Congress want to close the bank. Inertia is the strongest force in politics and the closest thing to an immortal being is a government agency, but this is one issue where reformers have a legitimate chance of victory.

Does Regulation Hurt Innovation?

How much does regulation crimp innovation? Not very much, according to a new study from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Nathan Goldschlag and George Mason University’s Alex Tabarrok. They find that “Federal regulation has had little to no effect on declining dynamism.” In other words, fewer businesses are starting up today than in previous years, but the authors don’t think federal regulations are among the major causes (see also Tabarrok’s summary over at Marginal Revolution).

That said, the authors are unsure of what else might be responsible: “The subsequent analysis will be unable to address the declining share of employment for young firms as evidence for the secular decline in dynamism and entrepreneurship (p.9).”

They base their regulation exoneration on a dataset called RegData, put together by analysts at the Mercatus Center (disclosure: one of whom is a former professor of mine). It is the best dataset yet devised for quantifying federal regulatory burdens. I’ve cited it before in some of my own work, and will very likely do so again. RegData works by counting the number of times the terms “shall,” “must,” “may not,” “prohibited,” and “required” appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. These individual restrictions are then broken down by industry and over time, going back to 1997. The total number of such restrictions currently in effect is more than one million.

But RegData has limits, and Goldschlag and Tabarrok have exceeded them. RegData counts the number of burdens, but does not estimate how much each one costs. These costs are over the map. One “shall” burden may be nearly costless, such as requiring a business to post a notice of local labor practices in the break room. Given the cost of printing posters and the minute or two of staff time required to hang it up every year, this may or may not cost a business a dollar per year. Another “shall” requiring power plant scrubbers may cost billions of dollars per year. Even though those rules both count as one restriction, they have very different costs.

RegData is state-of-the-art. But the art needs to improve its state before one can convincingly argue that the Code of Federal Regulations doesn’t harm economic dynamism.

For example, regulations tend to help incumbent firms, and give newcomers an artificial disadvantage. Tabarrok and Goldschlag agree with this point, finding that “job creation appears slightly positively correlated with regulation at the industry level (p.10).” And every worker who gets a job at an established firm is one who isn’t working at a startup. The labor force is fluid enough that this isn’t a zero-sum game, but regulations helping incumbent firms still have a crowding-out effect on startups. Regulations still hurt dynamism.

There are two points in Goldschlag and Tabarrok’s favor. One is big, and one is small. The small one is that federal regulations are only part of the story. They also acknowledge “other sources of regulation such as state legislation and judicial regulation through the common law (p.21).” We can add to this local-level and international-level regulations, as well as other countries’ domestic-level regulations that affect U.S. businesses.

Innovation does not necessarily respect boundaries. No doubt some companies offshore many R&D activities when domestic regulations make them too difficult. The companies then bring the fruits of those innovations to the U.S. later, so consumers still  benefit, if more slowly. In these cases, the amount of innovation occurring inside the United States decreases, but the overall amount of innovation is only lightly affected, if at all.

The big point is barely alluded to in the paper. It is that the underlying institutions of social cooperation, market exchange, and dynamism are strong enough that federal regulation has, according to Goldschlag and Tabarrok’s analysis, so far been unable to squelch them. Just as a balloon pressed on one end pushes air to the other end, people will still find ways to cooperate and exchange with each other even when regulations push down on them. This inner strength of human cooperation is my great source of optimism, and Tabarrok draws on similar themes in his excellent 2011 e-book Launching the Innovation Renaissance.

Goldschlag and Tabarrok’s coda is less sensationalist than their lede, but probably more accurate: “global dynamism… may be increasing even as measured national dynamism decreases.” We shall see how things go, but on balance, look for human lives to continue to improve in the future. This will happen despite growing federal regulations, not because of them.

Ex-Im Bank as Revenue Generator?

Here’s a letter I wrote to the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette that appears in today’s paper:

 The Post-Gazette’s editorial board calls on Congress to reauthorize the Export-Import Bank because the agency supposedly nets the government a profit (“Save the Ex-Im Bank: A Frugal Congress Must Keep a Revenue Generator”).

This is misleading for two reasons.

First, Ex-Im’s self-reported profits are largely the result of creative accounting practices. A recent Congressional Budget Office study using industry-standard fair-value accounting rules (“Fair-Value Estimates of the Cost of Selected Federal Credit Programs for 2015-2024,” May 2014) found that Ex-Im loses an average of $200 million per year.

Second, even if Ex-Im did make a $675 million profit last year, this is less than two-tenths of 1 percent of last year’s $483 billion budget deficit.

If Ex-Im’s goal is to raise revenue, it is spectacularly ineffective.

Congress should let this corruption-enabling program expire and turn its attention elsewhere.

RYAN YOUNG
Fellow
Competitive Enterprise Institute
Washington, D.C.

The writer is author of the study “Ten Reasons to Abolish the Export-Import Bank.”

20 States Raise Minimum Wage: Happy New Year?

The minimum wage is one of the most popular policies for fighting poverty, and proposed increases to it usually poll very well. The $7.25 per hour federal minimum wage hasn’t increased since 2009, so now many states are enacting their own minimum wage hikes. Twenty states are inaugurating 2015 with new increases.

Danielle Paquette’s recent Washington Post opinion piece, “20 states just raised the minimum wage. It wasn’t enough,” rounds up many of those increases, which range from Florida’s 12-cent hourly hike to as much as $1.25 per hour. Already, the New Year increases are “fattening the wallets of about 3.1 million Americans,” Paquette argues. A similar December 31 New York Times opinion piece by Rachel Abrams carries the headline, “States’ Minimum Wages Rise, Helping Millions of Workers.”

That sounds about right, as far as it goes. Roughly 2 to 3 percent of U.S. workers earn the minimum wage. With a late 2014 labor force of 156 million people, 3.1 million fatter wallets is in the right ballpark. Yet, these minimum wage increases will not help reduce poverty. Why? The reason is tradeoffs.

Paquette and Abrams only tell half the story. Millions of workers are getting a raise, but those raises come at a cost. Other workers directly pay for those raises through reduced hours, firings, benefit cuts, and other harms. Those workers and would-be workers have few defenders. My colleague Iain Murray and I recently compiled some of the many costs to these neglected souls:

Workers are fired, hours are cut, jobs are not created, non-wage perks, including insurance, free parking, free meals, and vacation days evaporate, annual bonuses shrink, prices rise, (squeezing minimum wage earners themselves), big businesses gain an artificial competitive advantage over their smaller competitors, and crime rates rise. It is a bleak litany.

Are those tradeoffs worth it? That is a value judgment each person needs to make on his or her own. It is perfectly legitimate to argue that the benefits some workers get from a minimum wage increase are worth throwing other workers out of their jobs or denying them the on-the-job perks mentioned above. But it doesn’t seem like a very humane stance.

The point is that there is no free lunch. One cannot simply wish tradeoffs away, as so many minimum wage proponents insist on doing. Minimum wages have a reverse-Robin Hood effect. Those who benefit from minimum wage increases often do so at the direct expense of people worse off than themselves. Honesty demands that one at least acknowledge that these tradeoffs exist, and take them into account when considering the next minimum wage increase.

Reminder of Basic Principles

From p. 158 of The Social Dilemma, Volume 8 of Gordon Tullock’s Selected Works:

Altogether, the extent to which people have freedom is more or less an inverse function of the number of laws in force.

Think of it as a very 20th century way of saying the same thing Tacitus said about two millennia ago:

The more corrupt the state, the more numerous the laws.

Some principles are timeless. One of them is that simplicity is beautiful, and honest.

New Minimum Wage Study: Tradeoffs Exist

Many progressives strongly support minimum wage increases. This is troubling, because the effects those increases actually have on many poor people are regressive. Signaling your concern for the poor is different from actually helping the poor; feeling good about yourself is often different from actually doing good for others. At the very least, minimum wage supporters should acknowledge that the minimum wage has tradeoffs. It is not a free lunch.

A new study by UC-San Diego economists Jeffrey Clemens and Michael Wither on the minimum wage reaffirms the obvious. Some workers benefit from minimum wage increases, and this is a good thing. But it comes at a cost. Other workers lose their jobs:

Over the late 2000s, the average effective minimum wage rose by nearly 30 percent across the United States. Our best estimate is that this period’s minimum wage increases reduced working-age adults’ employment-to-population ratio by 0.7 percentage point. This accounts for 14 percent of the total decline over the relevant time period.  [p.5]

This finding is in line with what I’ve pointed out before, that the minimum wage has a reverse-Robin Hood effect. Some workers lose their entire income, which gets transferred instead to other workers fortunate enough to keep their jobs, and get raises besides. Income redistribution programs are supposed to flow from better-off people to worse-off people—not the other way around.

If the goal is to lift as many people as possible out of poverty, minimum wage increases are simply not up to the task. The tradeoffs are too severe.

Clemens and Wither also find another, less publicized effect:

In addition to reducing employment, we find that binding minimum wage increases increased the likelihood that targeted individuals work without pay (by 2 percentage points or 12 percent). [p. 4]

They call this the “internship effect.” Internships are often restricted to people well-off enough to afford working for little or no pay for a few months, or even a year, while they learn how to do a particular job. Clemens and Wither find that the internship effect “is concentrated among individuals with at least some college education [p. 4].” Lower-income workers without any college education tend to simply be disemployed altogether. Minimum wage increases hurt the poorest of the poor, intentionally or not.

Iain Murray’s and my recent Washington Examiner article lists other minimum wage tradeoffs:

Breaking out of poverty is difficult for many people, and the evidence is that a minimum wage adds to the difficulty. Workers are fired, hours are cut, jobs are not created, non-wage perks, including insurance, free parking, free meals, and vacation days evaporate, annual bonuses shrink, prices rise, (squeezing minimum wage earners themselves), big businesses gain an artificial competitive advantage over their smaller competitors, and crime rates rise. It is a bleak litany.

Clemens and Wither have put a number on just how much artificial unemployment recent minimum wage hikes have caused: an additional 0.7 percentage points in the working-age adults’ employment-to-population ratio. This translates to just a few tenths of percentage points in the traditional unemployment rate statistic. Which, more importantly, also translates to unnecessary hardship for hundreds of thousands of poor people. They have also added the internship effect to the bleak litany of minimum wage tradeoffs.

In short: like it or not, supporting a minimum wage increase means supporting throwing deserving people out of work. Good intentions do not equal good results.

Towards a Humbler Monetary Policy

Is it possible for opposite policies to both be wrong? Over at the Washington Examiner, I argue that it is. The U.S. is ending its quantitative easing program just as Japan is ramping its up. Those seemingly opposite policy paths are rooted in the same mistaken philosophy. I argue instead for a humbler monetary policy:

 Both Yellen and Kuroda should move their focus away from stimulus, exchange rates and constant tinkering, and toward stability, honesty and predictability in their price systems. Easing of $1.66 trillion has had almost no effect on the U.S. economy. How reality will stack up against the Bank of Japan’s predictions, no one knows.

Along the way there are discussions of Keynesian liquidity traps, the Taylor rule, NGDP targeting, and Bitcoin. The larger point is that central bankers are barking up the wrong tree. Instead of manipulating various economic indicators, they should concentrate on creating a stable, predictable, and honest price system that enables more investment, better investment decisions, and more innovation. Entrepreneurship, not interest rate tinkering, is what causes economic growth and mass prosperity.

Read the whole thing here; see also a facsimile of the print edition here, starting on p. 26.

Quotation of the Day

Gordon Tullock, in 1965’s The Politics of Bureaucracy, on who’s really in charge in a democracy, on p. 133 of volume 6 of his selected works, Bureacuracy:

[W]e must recognize that the slogan: “The mob is in the streets. I must find out where it is going, for I am its leader,” is a good one for any democratic politician.

The politician looks like he’s in charge, but isn’t really. And in a mass of voters, none of them are really in charge either, since no single voter has more than an infinitesimal influence on the outcome.

This isn’t necessarily a bad thing, though. Single-sovereign situations are almost always less than free. And while I bemoan the lack of economic liberalism in today’s public opinion, it’s something of a miracle the policies we see aren’t even worse. The structure of democracy has a lot to do with it.

No Triple Mandate for the Fed

In a recent speech, Fed Chair Janet Yellen sent a signal that the Fed might be considering expanding its mission to include reducing economic inequality. Seeing as the Fed already has a dual mandate, this would amount to a triple mandate. Over at the American Spectator, Iain Murray and I explain why that wouldn’t work as planned, and instead offer a humbler vision for the Fed:

 If there is a guiding principle to effective Fed policy, it is that simplicity is beautiful. A complex, contradictory, unpredictable, and unstable triple mandate does the poor no favors. If the Fed seeks to maintain a stable, predictable, and honest price system as its sole monetary policy objective, it will do more to lift people out of poverty than any double or triple mandate.

Read the whole thing here.

Gordon Tullock, R.I.P.

Imagine making Nobel-worthy contributions to a discipline in which you had almost no formal training. It’s an amazing feat. Gordon Tullock is one of the few to accomplish it. We at CEI are deeply saddened to learn that he has just passed away. But what a life he led, all 92 years of it. That, we can celebrate. Born in 1922 in Rockford, Illinois, Tullock served in World War II. He spent some time in the foreign service in China and Korea, and pondered making a career of it. But his pursuit of a law degree at the University of Chicago changed his life—along with many others.

At the beginning of Tullock’s career, he had just the barest sketch of economics in his head, mostly from the one class he ever took in the subject. He drew masterpieces from that sketch. Tullock co-founded public choice theory, and invented the now-ubiquitous idea of rent-seeking. He did more than anyone else to apply the economic way of thinking to fields as diverse as law, science, military tactics, elections, and biology; his multi-disciplinary approach lives on under the name of economic imperialism. Countless scholars today make their daily bread pruning trails that Tullock blazed. And for 25 years, Tullock edited the academic journal Public Choice, giving a high-profile forum to high-quality scholarship that might never have seen the light of day without his stewardship. Few people have been more important to the world of ideas than Gordon Tullock.

Early in his career, Tullock met James Buchanan. Together they wrote The Calculus of Consent, published in 1962. Buchanan won the economics Nobel in 1986, largely because of that book. But Tullock never won, despite vocal outcries from large segments of the profession. He now becomes the award’s all-time snub in its 45-year history. Even so, Buchanan and Tullock made quite the duo. Their friendship and collaboration spanned decades. Don Boudreaux once described Buchanan and Tullock as the Lennon and McCartney of economics.

Don’s comparison rings true. Buchanan, like Lennon, was the more philosophical of the pair, so it isn’t a perfect analogy, as Don points out. But overall, as the economic equivalent of a songwriter, Buchanan was McCartney—cleaner and more conventional. Few musicians have been more daring than John Lennon. And no economist is more daring than Gordon Tullock. He was simply relentless, and yes, he could be cocky (though he sometimes had a sense of humor about it). He made a career of applying the economic way of thinking to places nobody else even thought about—and unlike certain of Lennon’s experiments, Tullock’s usually worked. If there is such a thing as a natural-born economist, Gordon Tullock was it. He could look at almost any subject and find economic insights. A brief tour through some of his scholarship makes that more than obvious.

When Tullock and Buchanan wrote The Calculus of Consent, they paved new ground that today guides entire research programs at major universities. Public choice theory, the fancy-sounding name for their approach, is actually quite simple: the application of economics to politics. Economics teaches that people respond to incentives. And politicians are people, remember. They are not the insensate black boxes that many economic models paint them as. Perhaps politicians respond to their incentives? The basic idea is common sense. It even predates Machiavelli in the literature. But most economists and political scientists had lost that common sense by Tullock’s time, when a dreamier, more idealized vision of political behavior prevailed. Tullock and Buchanan restored some much-needed realism.

Tullock and Buchanan’s book also taught important lessons to political reformers. It is not enough to elect virtuous politicians. They need the incentive to behave virtuously. The rules of the political game are what shape those incentives. If you want better results, you need better rules. Today’s emphasis on treating root problems, as opposed to mere symptoms, owes much to The Calculus of Consent. This approach is a cardinal principle of CEI’s approach to regulatory reform. Much of our work would not be possible without Gordon Tullock.

Tullock’s first major solo effort was The Politics of Bureaucracy, which came out in 1965. It applies the economic way of thinking—incentives, tradeoffs, knowledge problems—to how politicians and regulatory officials behave inside their various hierarchies. Its analysis can come across as mercenary, but it does have the benefit of being largely true.

Later in his career, Tullock followed it up with 1992’s Economic Hierarchies, Organization, and the Structure of Production, which follows a similar theme (both books are collected here). It is more refined, reflecting the nearly 30 years since its prequel. But its overall framework needed no updates. Presidents, congressmen, the EPA, the now-defunct Civil Aeronautics Board, and others did all they could to prove Tullock right in the years between those two books. Their proofs continue to pile up.

One year after The Politics of Bureaucracy, Tullock turned his economist’s eye to science. More specifically, given how the scientific profession is set up, with its dependence upon universities, tenure, and government grants, how does that color scientists’ professional behavior? That’s what The Organization of Inquiry is about. In that book, Tullock predicts the emergence of what we now call Google—in 1966. Tullock also had insights on why many scientists are reflexively pro-government—that’s where their funding comes from. He also explains why many scientists choose the research programs they do, and why they reach the conclusions they do—their grants depend on both their topics and their conclusions. Politically unpopular research areas tend to receive little funding, especially if their findings cut against political priorities. Tullock’s ideas provide much insight into why independent groups such as CEI take so much heat from politically-dependent groups.

1967 marked the third year in a row Tullock made a major intellectual innovation. That innovation is called rent-seeking. Anne Krueger came up with the name in 1974, but the original idea is Tullock’s. In economics jargon, the word “rent” has a special meaning. It doesn’t mean paying the monthly rent on your apartment, or the lease on your car. In economics, a rent is an above-normal profit. Suppose you own a business in a sector that usually makes a five percent profit. But you make a 15 percent profit. That extra ten percent is a rent. Apple made a good-size rent when it introduced the iPhone out of nowhere. Competitors such as Samsung and Motorola now have their own competing products and are eating into that rent, which will eventually disappear altogether.

Apple made its rent honestly. Steve Jobs and his colleagues came up with an important innovation that provides value for millions of people. Tullock’s term “rent-seeking” is reserved for people who secure extra-high profits dishonestly. A steel company lobbies a politician to put up a tariff against a foreign competitor. A renewable energy company grabs after a multi-million dollar subsidy. A small business convinces its local government to require all of its competitors to apply for costly licenses, which can be approved or denied by the very people already in that business (this actually happens). The common theme to rent-seeking is using government to secure profits a company can’t make honestly.

Rent-seeking is everywhere. It has been around since the very invention of government. But it took Gordon Tullock to call it what it is, and to make rent-seeking as odious to intellectuals as it is to everyone else. Free-market thinkers have always been against rent-seeking, and so have many of their critics. Tullock made it possible for them come to common terms—though this project remains a work in progress.

Finally, the most fun of all of Tullock’s projects was to make economics a discipline without frontiers. Military strategy, elections, lawmaking—if there was a way to apply the economic way of thinking to a subject, Tullock figured out a way to do it, and his sheer joy in doing so is contagious. He was the first economic imperialist. Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner, of Freakonomics fame, are probably today’s most famous disciples of this approach that Tullock pioneered.

One of the most fertile frontiers Tullock did away with was applying the economic way of thinking to the natural world. The coal tit, a small bird, was one of his most famous subjects. Its favorite food source is a small moth larva that incubates inside pine cones. Tullock, knowing that Mother Nature is the world’s best economist, observed that the coal tit follows the law of demand. In his words, it is a “careful shopper.” Where there are lots of pine cones, the coal tit pecks at the easiest-to-reach larvae and quickly moves on to the next pine cone, even though there is plenty of food left.

Where pine cones are scarce, and there are few alternative food sources, it will keep on at each pine cone until it gets every last bit of food, even when doing so is difficult (or the “price” is higher). This simple bird’s innate knowledge of prices and opportunity costs far exceeds that of most human intellectuals. Tullock calls this sub-field of natural science bio-economics. It deserves much more attention.

These are just some of Tullock’s contributions. Most of them are collected in Liberty Fund’s ten-volume set of Tullock’s selected works. Many others are scattered throughout the hundreds of articles published in the Public Choice journal during Tullock’s 25-year stewardship. Even though he’s gone now, Tullock will still make many more contributions in the years to come. He played a major role in developing the talents of many of today’s most formidable economic and political scholars. His legacy will impact their still more numerous students, and all of their achievements. We at CEI are not alone in mourning his loss. Nor are we alone in celebrating his achievements.