Category Archives: Economics

Ron Chernow – Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr.

Ron Chernow – Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr.

I read this as part of my recent research on antitrust regulation; Rockefeller’s Standard Oil remains a touchstone case in the field. Chernow does a good job of portraying Rockefeller as neither devil nor saint. Just as people today get hyper-emotional about billionaires such as Bill Gates or Jeff Bezos, Rockefeller was a hotly divisive figure in his day. His detractors bordered on the obsessive, especially Ida Tarbell, who comes across as apoplectic as Koch and Soros obsessives do today.

Rockefeller’s father was a quack doctor selling natural remedies who left his family for months at a time, and turned out to be a bigamist. Rockefeller was his father’s opposite in almost every way, except for their shared insistence on always paying their debts on time. He also had his credulous side, believing in homeopathy and other quack remedies. He retained a strict Baptist faith for his entire life, which left him with a rather narrow mind—though this didn’t stop him from having a case of wandering hands in his old age that was creepy even by the standards of the time.

On the other hand, Rockefeller always tithed, both before and after he made his fortune, and had great concern for charity and the poor. Despite his wealth, he does not come off as a greedy man. He didn’t seem to enjoy money so much as putting in the required work to make money, and succeeding at it. He also played a large role in the founding of the University of Chicago, whose famous economics department would likely have appalled Rockefeller, who was a trade protectionist and favored a managed cartel economic system that was in vogue during the Progressive Era.

Chernow’s focus is more on the man than the company, but Standard Oil is entwined enough with Rockefeller that the reader sees just how quickly the company grew, and how it became a popular lightning rod. The ongoing controversy over Standard Oil’s discounted rail shipping rates comes off as just plain dumb, just as the controversy over tying web browsers into operating systems was in the Microsoft antitrust case a century later. Chernow is no free-market ideologue, but the fact that Standard Oil continued to reduce prices and expand output reveal how tenuous its dominant market share—as is the fact that it nearly collapsed as electric lights displaced kerosene lamps. If the automobile hadn’t emerged around this time, and Standard hadn’t been clever enough to pivot to gasoline and lubricants and away from kerosene, the big 1911 antitrust suit would likely never have happened. Monopolies cannot last without government help—though Rockefeller is not entirely blameless on this front.

Rockefeller’s long life also allows Chernow to treat the Rockefeller children and grandchildren in some detail, and as with any family, they were a varied lot. Some shared his business acumen. Some tried but weren’t quite up to the task. Grandson Nelson became New York governor and Gerald Ford’s vice president. Daughter Edith took to a bohemian lifestyle, and even fell in the psychoanalyst Carl Jung’s circle, which ended up being quite expensive, and more than a little scandalous.

Tyler Cowen – Create Your Own Economy: The Path to Prosperity in a Disordered World

Tyler Cowen – Create Your Own Economy: The Path to Prosperity in a Disordered World

One of Cowen’s best books. It has some surprisingly personal takes on autism. Cowen applies that spectrum’s cognitive advantages and disadvantages to the new custom algorithm-driven economy, and makes an entire book out of it that is difficult to put down. This surprisingly human turn, combined with Cowen’s love of dynamism and customization, make for a needed calming influence on how to view a changing world.

The Populist Approach to Problem-Solving

From Kindle location 6077 of Peter Boettke’s 2018 book F. A. Hayek: Economics, Political Economy and Social Philosophy:

There is a fundamental contradiction in the populist critique of the establishment, both left and right, which is that government is failing them, but it is failing as it grows larger in scale and scope of activities. Yet, precisely because it is failing, it must grow in scale and scope to address the failure.

On the Radio: Metal Tariffs and NAFTA/USMCA

I’ll appear on the Jim Bohannon Show tonight at 10:00 ET to talk about President Trump’s decision to ease steel and aluminum tariffs against Canada and Mexico, and how it will impact the NAFTA/USMCA trade agreement.

Trump Mostly Removes Steel, Aluminum Tariffs against Mexico, Canada: Barriers Still Higher than in 2017

The Trump administration is mostly lifting its steel aluminum tariffs on Canada and Mexico, effective 48 hours from today’s announcement. But metal tariffs will remain higher than they were just 14 months ago. They have raised consumer prices for carshousing, and washing machines, while preventing passage of President Trump’s signature revised NAFTA/USMCA trade agreement. Even now, passage is not guaranteed.

Retaliatory tariffs from Canada and Mexico also remain in place as of this writing (Update: Canada and Mexico are removing them, per The Wall Street Journal). The metal tariffs, enacted on national security grounds, will remain in place against Europe and Japan, which are both U.S. allies.​

Canadian and Mexican companies will also face a new compliance burden. They will have to monitor and report their steel and aluminum sources to ensure they are not re-exporting too much metal from China.

The tariffs were overkill as a negotiating tactic for the NAFTA/USMCA agreement, which would have little impact on trade. It will slightly raise car prices, slightly lower dairy prices, and have a few anti-China provisions of likely dubious effectiveness—and that’s about it.

Over these small potatoes, GM, and Ford are each reporting billion-dollar losses related to tariffs. Farmers, a core key part of Trump’s support base, are being hit just as hard, with the administration floating tens of billions of dollars of wealth transfers to shift the blow onto other demographics. The steel industry has benefitted some, but only at steel-using industries’ direct expense, and an estimated cost of $900,000 per job saved.

All this was avoidable. If anything, Mexico and Canada may have been willing to go through with USMCA formalities as a gesture of goodwill towards the U.S. president, who views it as an important political victory despite the low stakes. Instead, Trump’s tariff strategy turned an easy process into a combative, protracted negotiation for no good reason, while trade barriers remain higher than in 2017.

Good news today, but keep it in context.

Alice Rivlin, 1931-2019

Some economists do more than teach classes and write books. Alice Rivlin, who passed away this week, was proof. She was the first director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), from 1975 to 1983, serving under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan. She helped develop many of the standards used for estimating how much legislation would cost if enacted. More importantly, she developed a reputation for keeping politicking out of the bill scoring.

Over in the executive branch, Rivlin was deputy director and then director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under President Bill Clinton. Though Rivlin worked mostly on fiscal issues, part of the OMB’s job is providing cost estimates for proposed regulations. Rivlin was in the OMB when Clinton issued the famous Executive Order 12866 on reforming the rulemaking process, and she played a significant role implementing it. Among other things, E.O. 12866 specifies the definition of a “significant” regulation and contains disclosure and cost estimate standards still in use today—at least when agencies bother to obey them.

Major accomplishments in budget and regulatory policy were apparently not enough, so Rivlin next took on monetary policy. She left the OMB in 1996 to become Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve, the number two position under then-chair Alan Greenspan, which she held until 1999.

Rivlin is perhaps best known for her work at the local level in the District of Columbia. The District was in a massive financial mess during the Marion Barry years, and Mayor Barry’s personal problems were not helping matters. Recommendations from a Rivlin-chaired task force resulted in the federal government stripping the mayor of most authority and establishing a committee to tend to the district’s finances. Rivlin eventually chaired that committee as well until it disbanded in 2001.

Milton Friedman observed that economists who go to work in government often suffer a decline in the quality and independence of their work; part of the price of influence is not telling the boss when he’s wrong, or at least not in public. Rivlin was an exception to that rule, successfully irking powerful politicians throughout her time in government. The CBO, for example, was initially created as a counter to President Nixon’s OMB.

Though Rivlin was a Democrat, she scored President Carter’s energy proposals honestly. For obvious reasons, this upset both the President and Democratic House Speaker Tip O’Neill, who needed legislation to campaign on. As a deficit hawk, Rivlin had two parties deserving criticism. When Rivlin was on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue working at OMB, President Reagan publicly expressed his displeasure when Rivlin called shenanigans on his deficit spending.

Rivlin also left a footprint in the think tank world, working at the Brookings Institution between government appointments. Her book “Systematic Thinking for Social Action” is one of Brookings’ best-selling books, and remains an influential text in public administration courses. She also taught courses at Georgetown, George Mason, and Harvard.

Rivlin’s 1993 book “Reviving the American Dream: The Economy, the States, and the Federal Government” makes the case for increased federalism, which is a rare stance among career Washingtonians. It is also somewhat ironic, given Rivlin’s role in a partial federal takeover of the D.C. local government. But her long experience with federal budget dysfunction gives her plenty of ammunition for arguing for devolving many federal tasks to the state level—and D.C.’s troubles were something of an outlier case. In Rivlin’s system, the federal government would focus more on foreign policy, with the states taking on education, health care, poor relief, transportation, and other tasks that are currently mostly federally administered. The federal government would establish some uniform standards for states to follow, but would be more of a supervisor than an actual policy actor.

Though Rivlin mostly retired from government work after Clinton’s second term ended, she served on the Simpson-Bowles Commission in 2010 that looked for ways to reduce the national debt. She continued to warn about the dangers of perpetual deficit spending for the rest of her life.

Rivlin also worked in a time, place, and occupation that were all far more difficult for women than today. Intentionally or not, she set some major precedents. It says a lot about Rivlin that despite her era’s social norms, strong personalities on both sides of the aisle respected her. She was a stickler for keeping politics out of her budget and cost estimates. This sometimes involved making very powerful people very upset, and she did it anyway. Her reputation for fairness was well-earned, even if some of her praises were sung through clenched teeth.

While CBO and OMB’s modeling techniques are not always very accurate, on Rivlin’s watch such shortcomings usually had more to do with the nature of forecasting than with poll results or an upcoming election.

Few economists can claim as many accomplishments in as many policy areas as Rivlin. She held important roles in the executive branch and the legislative branch, in the federal government and overseeing a local government, plus the Federal Reserve, and still found time to make scholarly and popular contributions to federalism, administrative structure, and debt reduction efforts. She also had the good sense to be a thorn in the side to both parties, even as she was a member of one of them—something that is sadly missing in Washington today.

John Maynard Keynes – The Economic Consequences of the Peace

John Maynard Keynes – The Economic Consequences of the Peace

Keynes was part of the British delegation in the post-World War I Versailles negotiations. He resigned in protest, and this 1919 book is his public statement of why. He correctly foresaw that the treaty’s harsh terms would lead to a second World War by inflaming German resentment and slowing civilian rebuilding.

Keynes had malleable views, and changed personae many times through the years; this Keynes of 1919 was different from the Keynes of 1930’s Treatise on Money or 1936’s General Theory. But in this book Keynes shows a sharp moral clarity, mirrored by a clarity in thought and, relatedly, prose that differentiates Economic Consequences of the Peace from many of his other works.

This book would also pair well with Ludwig von Mises’ 1927 book Liberalism, which similarly foresaw a second war that would be worse than the first. Mises argued that interventionist policies, besides fostering social tensions and instability, would economically weaken the Allied countries, making it more difficult for them to counter nationalist or communist threats. For all their differences, Keynes and Mises stood on common ground in wanting peace, and even a little bit on how to maintain it.

Boeing Pushes 100 Percent Tariffs on Airbus

Boeing, fresh off a victory in restoring the Export-Import Bank’s full lending authority, is floating the idea of a 100 percent tariff on Airbus aircraft and parts. Airbus is Boeing’s largest competitor. There are four factors in play here. The first three are public relations, the opportunity costs of cronyism, and how best to pursue a level playing field in the global economy. The fourth is the likely retaliation such a move would spark.

From a PR standpoint, Boeing wants to move public attention away from its safety issues with the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. Most of the press Boeing gets for Ex-Im and Airbus tariffs will be negative, and the company knows this. It would still likely prefer that people be upset about those than about its safety problems, which are an existential threat to more than just airline passengers.

To that point, Boeing arguing for an Airbus tariff right now is almost perfect news cycle timing. The China trade dispute and NAFTA/USMCA are hot stories. Just today, President Trump announced a six-month delay on a possible European auto tariff, which will both keep that story alive for a while and give Boeing time to fold an Airbus tariff into a possible action.

Boeing also has a Baptists-and-bootleggers story at the ready. The World Trade Organization ruled, correctly, that Airbus received unfair government subsidies when it launched its A350 and A380 aircraft. Under WTO rules, the U.S. is entitled to retaliate. But just because it can, doesn’t mean it should. An Airbus tariff is highly unlikely to spur needed reform.

This ties into the opportunity costs of cronyism. Boeing puts significant resources into lobbying for Export-Import Bank support, Airbus tariffs, and other preferential policies. All of those resources are not being used to address the 737 MAX safety issues. This might improve a decimal point somewhere in a quarterly earnings report in the short term. But Boeing’s misplaced priorities could cause long-term harm to both aviation safety and Boeing’s own competitiveness. Competing in Washington is not the same thing as competing in the marketplace. Boeing’s investors should be upset at the company’s behavior.

Companies that engage in heavy rent-seeking are less profitable than more market-oriented companies. Even in Boeing’s case, the most profitable years in company history happened when Ex-Im was unable to offer its usual financing.

Which brings up the third point: It is not enough to have a level playing field. That level must be raised, not lowered. Boeing is right that Airbus’ massive government subsidies are unfair. But the way to address the problem is not to copy Europe’s policy mistakes. Don’t sink down to their level, raise them up to ours—though, admittedly, our own level of cronyism has much room for improvement. But reformers must start somewhere.

If anything, Boeing might have an interest in further tying up Airbus in webs of subsidies and favorable regulations—though I would strongly disagree with this strategy. Government protection tends to cause sclerosis in its beneficiaries, and Boeing should be pleased at the long-term implications of Airbus’ comfort. I am not a fan of this zero-sum thinking, but Boeing might be. Even from their self-interested perspective, an Airbus tariff is a bad idea.

Finally, as I pointed out yesterday, tariffs are nearly always met with retaliation, not cooperation. The European Union almost certainly will not change its tune on Airbus subsidies in response to a U.S. tariff—especially in a global market with many non-U.S. customers. Europe will harden its stance, likely at Boeing’s expense.

Given how tense global trade relations currently are, even if Boeing is just blowing PR smoke, this is a bad time to do it. Better for the company to refocus on making safe, innovative products than spending its resources on a political game with no winners.

See also relevant CEI scholarship on trade, the Ex-Im Bank, and the ethics of rent-seeking.

William Bernstein – The Birth of Plenty: How the Prosperity of the Modern World was Created

William Bernstein – The Birth of Plenty: How the Prosperity of the Modern World was Created

Last year I read Bernstein’s history of trade, A Splendid Exchange, and enjoyed it immensely. This book has a broader focus—the rise of modern global prosperity. Bernstein is an excellent popular writer, and should be read more widely. He doesn’t go into the same depth as other scholars on the subject such as Julian Simon, Deirdre McCloskey, Joel Mokyr, Stephen Davies, Nathan Rosenberg, Henri Pirenne, and others. But his genial delivery and general ethos of openness and dynamism coupled with a coherent historical narrative make for an excellent read.

Bernstein’s background is in finance, and books from that genre are usually charitably described as snake oil. Rare exceptions include non-sensationalist buy-and-hold advocates such as Burton Malkiel of A Random Walk Down Wall Street fame. While I’ve not read Bernstein’s financial advice books and likely never will, he is an excellent historian. I hope he writes more in that vein.

Trade War State of Play: China, USMCA

If President Trump’s trade war has a single takeaway, it is this: Raising tariffs is an ineffective bargaining strategy. When the U.S. raises its tariffs, other countries always retaliate, and always become less cooperative. Trump’s tariff-heavy bargaining strategy is harming both of his top trade priorities, China and the new NAFTA/USMCA trade agreement.

Right now, the big news is another round of tit-for-tat in the U.S.-China dispute. On the night of Sunday, May 4, right before a week of high-level negotiations, President Trump threatened a 25 percent tariff on $200 billion of Chinese goods if the two governments did not reach an agreement by the following Friday, May 10.

Trump has made drastic last-minute threats in the past as a tactic to speed up negotiations and move them in his favor. Sometimes he follows through. But often he withdraws, as when he recently threatened to shut down the U.S.-Mexican border and quickly backed off. He considers it an advantage for such follow-through to be unpredictable.

This time he followed through. But the Chinese government did not accede to his demands. Instead, it is raising its own barriers against U.S. products. Every one of Trump’s tariff increases so far has been met with retaliation, not cooperation. The strategy does not work.

Another round of trade talks is likely in the next few weeks. President Trump, in line with his established strategy, is mulling extending tariffs to all Chinese imports if matters are not settled soon. It is safe to predict that another tariff will garner the same response as all of its predecessors. The pattern was set long ago. With Trump unlikely to change his stripes, it is well past time for Congress to retake the taxing authority it delegated away to the president back in the 1960s and 1970s. Absent such reform, the U.S.-China trade war could be long-term.

China is not the only dispute in which Trump’s tariffs are blocking his goals. The president’s top domestic priority is passing the new NAFTA/USMCA trade agreement. The biggest remaining sticking point there is Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs. These are meant in part to get Mexico and Canada to acquiesce to U.S. negotiation demands. Instead, the tariffs are causing holdups and resentments in both countries— and in Congress.

For legal reasons, the tariffs were enacted on national security grounds. Mexico and Canada are both offended that a close ally is publicly calling them national security threats. They are withholding cooperation. Back home, many congressional Democrats and even some Republicans want the steel and aluminum tariffs repealed as a condition for ratifying the agreement. Trump, so far, is unwilling to agree. Members of Congress are also using tariff repeal as a bargaining chip for non-trade issues where the president needs congressional cooperation. This could stymie administration agenda items well outside of trade.

President Trump has two options going forward. He can double down on his mistakes, or he can change to a strategy that does work. A positive change would involve repealing the problem-causing tariffs, reengaging the World Trade Organization’s dispute resolution process, and re-joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Of course, such a change would require significant creativity in PR framing in order to save face on Trump’s end, but smart diplomats on all sides can find ways to do so.

Unfortunately, the president is committed to his tariff strategy and likely will continue to double down on failure. This creates an important role for both parties to play. Democrats need to check an executive branch run amok and affirm their principles of dynamism, openness, and economic inclusiveness. Republicans from the free-market wing of the party need to give their longstanding principles a higher place than they currently give to an outlier personality who will disappear from the political scene in 2025 at the latest.

This post has focused mostly on political strategy. It is well-established that tariffs are even more harmful to the U.S. economy than they are to U.S. foreign policy interests.

For more on that side of the issue, see Iain Murray’s and my study, “Traders of the Lost Ark.”