Category Archives: Economics

David Salsburg – The Lady Tasting Tea: How Statistics Revolutionized Science in the Twentieth Century

David Salsburg – The Lady Tasting Tea: How Statistics Revolutionized Science in the Twentieth Century

A history of the discipline of statistics that I found immensely useful. Rather than memorizing by rote what a p-statistic is or what regression does, this book tells the stories behind them. Salsburg tells the why and the how, rather than explaining the what and being done with it. Salsburg tells the stories of the people who invented modern statistical techniques and concepts, their historical context, why their innovations were needed, what types of problems they were built to solve, and what their techniques’ drawbacks and limitations are, as well as their positives. This book was recommended by Michael Munger, who heads Duke University’s Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) program, and I am glad I listened.

Ron Chernow – The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance

Ron Chernow – The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance

More of a corporate history than a history of the Morgan family. But this 1990 book, Chernow’s first, also chronicles the evolution of banking and finance from the Industrial Revolution up to about the 1980s. I picked this up due to an interest in antitrust law, competition, and the rise of big business. While this book is ultimately more useful for financial regulation scholars, I still found it useful. And though its characters are not as compelling as Chernow’s Rockellers in Titan, it is an enjoyable read.

Antitrust Basics: Regulatory Uncertainty

Antitrust laws are not enforced to the letter. They are a matter of regulators’ and judges’ discretion. If they were applied literally, every business transaction would be illegal:

  • A company that sells a product at a lower price than competitors can be charged with predatory pricing.
  • A company that sells a product for the same price as competitors can be charged with collusion.
  • A company that sells a product at a higher price than competitors can be charged with abusing monopoly power.

This exhausts all pricing possibilities. Fortunately, antitrust laws are not enforced consistently, so ordinary businesses do not need to worry. With laws like these on the books, such discretion is a good thing. While regulations do not need to satisfy philosopher Immanuel Kant’s hyper-strict categorical imperative to be acceptable policy, antitrust regulation falls short of any reasonable standard of sound policy.

A century of case law has evolved some antitrust guidelines that companies can try to comply with. But judicial precedents can be overturned with no warning any time a new case is brought. There are few bright-line legislative or judicial standards for antitrust enforcement. Under the “rule of reason” standard that prevailed before the consumer welfare standard took over in the 1970s and 1980s, there were none. Antitrust enforcement is mostly guided by a mix of inconsistent judicial precedents, regulators’ personal discretion, and political factors unrelated to market competition; cases are not always chosen on the merits.

Even the mere threat of antitrust enforcement can have a preemptive chilling effect on innovation, attempts at new business strategies, and potential efficiency-enhancing arrangements. Uncertainty is the enemy of investment. In the long run, this can have significant negative impacts on consumer welfare as fewer new products come to market, and companies seek fewer ways to lower prices.

Discretion does have a place in regulation. Written rules can’t possibly cover every situation, and they should have some flexibility to allow reasonable exceptions. But when an entire branch of law is based almost entirely on discretion, as in antitrust regulation, uncertainty reigns—with all the predictable negative consequences that come with regulatory uncertainty.

For more, see Wayne Crews’ and my study, “The Case against Antitrust Law: Ten Areas Where Antitrust Policy Can Move on from the Smokestack Era.” Further resources are at antitrust.cei.org.

Antitrust Basics: Rule of Reason Standard vs. Consumer Welfare Standard

Regulators have used two different standards to judge antitrust cases over the last century or so: the “rule of reason” standard and the “consumer welfare” standard. This post will briefly introduce them both.

The rule of reason standard was used for most of antitrust regulation’s history. It heavily relies on a judge’s discretion—whatever they think is reasonable is the rule. This usually, but not always, contains an implicit big-is-bad ideological bent. The rule of reason standard is less well defined than both the preponderance of evidence standard used in most civil cases and the reasonable doubt standard used in criminal cases. It also gives weaker protections to defendants.

The consumer welfare standard slowly replaced the rule of reason starting in the 1970s, and gained mainstream acceptance by the 1980s. Under the consumer welfare standard, big is OK, so long as no consumers are harmed. This stricter standard has resulted in fewer antitrust prosecutions, and nearly two decades since the last landmark case, which ended in a draw against Microsoft.

In the current populist moment, the pendulum is swinging away from the consumer welfare standard and back towards the old reason of rule standard.

Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis is one the intellectual fathers of the rule of reason standard. In 1911, during testimony before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Brandeis said, “I have considered and do consider, that the proposition that mere bigness can not be an offense against society is false, because I believe that our society, which rests upon democracy, cannot endure under such conditions.”

This feeling that size itself should a prosecutable offense ebbed and flowed over the decades, giving antitrust enforcement a distinct uncertainty and lack of clarity during the rule of reason era. In fact, during the New Deal, President Franklin Roosevelt reversed course almost completely, and wanted the government to actively encourage business cartels. After World War II, the old rule of reason standard resumed. Enforcement peaked in the early 1960s, then gradually receded.

During the rule of reason era, a company could never be quite sure if it was violating the law or not. An acceptable practice one year might not be if power changes hands in the next election, or if a new judge rules differently on a case than his predecessor would have.

Antitrust regulation had long been dominated by lawyers. Economists dating back to Adam Smith believed that monopolies were unsustainable without government help, with real-life examples limited to the Dutch East India Company and similar government-backed enterprises. If a company raises prices, another company can make a nice profit by undercutting it. If companies collude to restrict output to raise prices, the temptation to cheat is too strong to resist, and the cartel collapses on its own. As such, on-the-ground antitrust policy was of limited interest to economists. For them, this rarity was mostly a theoretical construct that existed in blackboard models.

Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission lawyers resented economists and their analysis both for ideological reasons and the fact that economic analysis, if consistently applied to antitrust law, would put most antitrust lawyers out of a job. After Arthur C. Pigou’s 1920 book “The Economics of Welfare” came out, welfare economics became all the rage. In this subfield, economists weigh a policy’s costs and benefits to the welfare of everyone involved and judge it accordingly. A welfare economist looking at antitrust isn’t going to care one way or the other about a company’s size. The question he is looking at is, does the current market structure benefit consumers or not? This approach led to the coining of the consumer welfare standard sometime in the 1960s.

By this time, a growing law and economics movement began to apply economic reasoning and methodology to antitrust regulation. A few economists were even able to get jobs at the Justice Department and Federal Ttrade Commission, though they likely won few popularity contests at first.

The new law and economics movement was at first largely centered at the University of Chicago, though law and economics departments now exist at most major universities. Early Chicago figures such as Ronald Coase, Aaron Director, and Frank Knight influenced a new generation of competition scholars who made the consumer welfare standard the mainstream practice in antitrust law. These scholars include Richard Posner, George Stigler, Yale Brozen, Robert Bork, Harold Demsetz, and Sam Peltzman, among others.

The most famous defense of the consumer welfare standard remains Robert Bork’s 1978 book “The Antitrust Paradox,” which was one of the first major law books to heavily incorporate economic analysis.

As the consumer welfare standard slowly and informally supplanted the rule of reason standard, antitrust activity greatly slowed. In 1981, the federal government dropped a 13-year long antitrust case against IBM after more than a decade of technological advancement and market competition rendered the case moot. In 1984, the government broke up the AT&T monopoly it had previously enforced, and the last hurrah for old school antitrust came with the Microsoft case, which ended with a settlement mostly in Microsoft’s favor. Since then, some mergers have been blocked, but always on consumer welfare grounds rather than the fear of bigness that had motivated Justice Brandeis.

Contrary to stereotype, most advocates of the consumer welfare standard do not oppose antitrust law. Even Robert Bork defends antitrust enforcement, arguing on p. 311 of “The Antitrust Paradox” that “Antitrust is valuable because in some cases it can achieve results more rapidly than can market forces. We need not suffer losses while waiting for the market to erode cartels and monopolistic mergers.”

This ignores both knowledge problems and public choice-style incentive problems facing regulators, as numerous scholars have noted. The best antitrust policy is no antitrust policy. But so long as antitrust regulations remain on the books, it is best to rein in their harm as much as possible with a strict consumer welfare standard for enforcement.

For more, see Wayne Crews’ and my paper, “The Case against Antitrust Law: Ten Areas Where Antitrust Policy Can Move on from the Smokestack Era.” Further resources are at antitrust.cei.org.

Harold J. Berman – Law and Revolution, The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition

Harold J. Berman – Law and Revolution, The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition

Berman’s thesis is beyond my ability to state succinctly. This is in part because he thinks in a spectrum of grays and colors rather than a simple binary black-and-white. Unlike many scholars, Berman admits that many things are multi-causal, and defy simplistic explanation. His goal is to explain why legal systems look the way they do, and where they come from. Berman’s thesis ties into the larger rise of modernity itself and the modern economy we enjoy today, but intentionally confines himself to the law, his area of expertise. To highlight some of Berman’s main themes, which all intertwine:

  • Modern legal systems are a result of competing jurisdictions. Just as the U.S. has separation of powers and federalism, Europe had church and state competing against each other, as well as kings and nobles squabbling among themselves, free cities adding another sovereign unit to the mix. Eventually, nation-states emerged as a major unit as well.
  • The rise of trade also played a role. If two traders had a dispute, it was difficult to determine which legal authority had jurisdiction. The king of the origin country? The destination country? Traders responded by developing their own mercantile law over time. This spontaneous order competed with both church and state laws, adding another element of competition.
  • Berman doesn’t use the term, but scholars from Elinor Ostrom to David Friedman call such legal systems “polycentric” (many-centered).
  • This process pre-dates the Reformation, which is where most scholars place the beginning of modern legal systems as we know them today. Berman instead dates the key event as the Papal Revolution, a multi-generation movement which peaked in the 1170s.
  • This marked the rise of the church as a major source of trans-national legal authority. For the first time, it competed directly against kings and nobles, and on equal footing. Church and state had separate but overlapping jurisdictions, and competed with each other to attract “clients” and patronage.
  • The competition was not always peaceful.
  • Berman doesn’t operate on a strict back-and-white, church-vs.-state axis. Nothing in history is that simple. There are many other important factors in play.
  • This isn’t quite a market process in action, but there are similarities.
  • This was a process, not an on-off switch. Even when change was at its fastest, the change would only be noticeable over the course of an entire lifetime. It was not centrally directed or planned, and it did not happen suddenly.
  • Nor was the process unidirectional. There were reactions against it, and there were countless other factors in play. Berman doesn’t go this far forward in history, but the French Revolution is an excellent example of such a reaction. The Revolution swept away the ancien regime and was secular, so on the surface it appeared to weaken both church and state. Its intellectual underpinnings rejected hodge-podge evolutionary polycentrism in favor of a more orderly, centralized, and aesthetic top-down legal ethos. Think the Napoleonic Code-vs.-common law debate that continues today.

This is a deep and dense work, and I have almost certainly not done it justice in this capsule review. But it is a rewarding read, and as someone who works on regulatory issues and institution-level reforms, this book was a game-changer. It changes how I view where today’s debates, legal conventions, and implicit assumptions come from, how they evolve over time, and where needed reforms might fit into larger historical trends.

Berman, who passed away in 2007, also wrote a sequel, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition. When I am feeling ambitious, I hope to one day attempt it.

Adam Shepard – Scratch Beginnings: Me, $25, and the Search for the American Dream

Adam Shepard – Scratch Beginnings: Me, $25, and the Search for the American Dream

After graduating from college, Shepard tried an experiment. He traveled to Charleston, South Carolina with nothing but $25, and gave himself one year to meet a goal of having $2,500 in savings, a car, and an apartment. Among the rules he set for himself was he was not allowed to take advantage of his college education or take help from his family. He spent about two months in a homeless shelter, working odd jobs, learning the city, and looking for an apartment. By the end, he found a stable job and met his goals, and almost seemed pretty happy. Unfortunately, a family member’s health meant he had to return home and care for them. Good on him for knowing what’s important, and he still accomplished his goal of refuting the class-based hopelessness he found in Barbara Ehrenreich’s book Nickel and Dimed.

Competing Antitrust Ideologies

Over at Liberty Fund’s EconLog, Pierre Lemieux has a thoughtful post on antitrust and ideology:

That antitrust legislation was a product of the first populist era (the end of the 19th century) and the succeeding progressive era (the beginning of the 20th) should raise a red flag.

A more general question can be asked: Isn’t as blindly ideological to claim that the market is nearly always efficient as it would be to claim that government intervention is nearly always efficient? This is a valid question, but I would argue the negative.

Read the whole thing.

Antitrust Basics: Misleading Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

This is the third entry in the “Antitrust Basics” series. See below for previous posts.

Market concentration is the most common reason for antitrust intervention. If a company has too large a market share, it can abuse that market power to raise prices, restrict output, and engage in all manner of anti-competitive business practices. A merger that would create a dominant player or significantly reduce the number of competitors is likely to be blocked. But how should market concentration be measured? Should it be by number of firms? Or by how much market share the biggest players control?

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) accounts for both factors. It also gives analysts a single numerical score they can work with, ranging from 0 to 10,000. It is also easy to calculate; the Justice Department shares the HHI formula here. A market with a large number of companies, in which each has an equally small market share, will have a low score. A market with few companies and one dominant player will have a high score.

For example, imagine two different markets, each with four companies. In one case, each company has an equal 25 percent market share. This market has an HHI score of 2,500. In the second case, one company has a 97 percent market share, and the other three each have a one percent market share. This yields a 9,412 HHI score, and quite possibly an antitrust case.

According to the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission’s joint Horizontal Merger Guidelines, an HHI of over 2,500 constitutes a highly concentrated market. The HHI is usually used in mergers to decide whether or not to allow a deal to go through—under the Hart-Scott Rodino Act of 1976, all mergers over a certain size have to be reviewed by regulators before they can be consummated.

According to the guidelines, Mergers in a moderately concentrated market (HHI score of 1,501 to 2,500) that increases HHI by more than 100 points “potentially raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny.”

Mergers in a highly concentrated market (HHI of more than 2,500) raising HHI by more than 200 points “will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power.”

These guidelines are not binding. The decision to block such a merger can vary with which party holds power, if a company is receiving bad publicity, or any other factor besides a predictable law. This uncertainty can have a chilling effect on deals that could benefit consumers.

This kind of quantitative analysis makes it easier for the Justice Department or the Federal Trade Commission to decide whether or not to bring a case against a company, or to block a proposed merger.

The HHI has a fatal flaw, though: the relevant market fallacy. The person crunching the numbers can define the relevant market any way they please, and can thus come up with nearly any HHI score they desire. This makes it analytically useless. In fact, during the fact-finding phase of a merger investigation, opposing counsel routinely fight over the relevant market size to be used in that case’s HHI calculations. Whatever decision is reached is arbitrary, and often depends more on the judge’s political views than anything else.

The fact that the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is so easy to game is by itself fatal. But that is not its only significant problem. As Judge Richard Posner observed in the second edition of his book “Antitrust Law,” “There is no sound basis in economic theory for thinking that if there are just a few major sellers in a market, competition will disappear automatically.” That is an empirical question, and one that regulators are incapable of answering.

This is not necessarily their fault; no one can predict the future. Even the merging companies themselves are unsure how their deal would work out. AOL and Time Warner found this out the hard way. By giving the illusion of quantitative rigor, the HHI often fools regulators into thinking they have solved the knowledge problem that vexes so many policymakers’ plans. This false confidence is dangerous to consumer welfare.

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is useless in answering the question of whether a merger or a given level of concentration would cause consumer harm. It should barred from use in antitrust cases.

For more, see Wayne Crews’ and my study, “The Case against Antitrust Law: Ten Areas Where Antitrust Policy Can Move on from the Smokestack Era.” Further resources are at antitrust.cei.org.

Previous posts in Ryan Young’s “Antitrust Basics” series:

Healthy Attitudes of Inquiry

From p. 6 of Vlad Tarko’s 2017 book Elinor Ostrom: An Intellectual Biography:

Good social scientists are like tourists who have yet to familiarize with the local rules or a little bit like children, asking funny questions about what everyone else just takes for granted.

This is a much healthier attitude of inquiry than the capital-C certainty many analysts have in their answers to social problems.

Peter Boettke – F. A. Hayek: Economics, Political Economy and Social Philosophy

Peter Boettke – F. A. Hayek: Economics, Political Economy and Social Philosophy

Boettke has both revived and deepened my appreciation of Hayek. He emphasizes the importance of institutions and rules of the game that I (and many others) thought Hayek had overlooked, at least in comparison to Douglass North, James Buchanan, Mancur Olson, and other thinkers.

He also clears up the common misconception that The Road to Serfdom is a slippery slope argument. Instead, Boettke argues it is an outgrowth of the great socialist calculation debate that dominated the economics profession in the 1920s and 1930s. Hayek’s teacher Ludwig von Mises argued that socialism is impossible because it has no price system. Without prices, any semblance of efficient resource allocation is impossible. Abba Lerner and Oskar Lange countered that not only is a planned economy possible, but experts can have fewer errors, redundancies, and other inefficiencies that come with free markets.

1944’s Road to Serfdom, looking back at this debate, argues that in addition to Mises’ calculation problem, a planned economy is incompatible with liberal institutions. Mises was right about the calculation problem, and Hayek expanded on Mises with his emphasis on knowledge problems, and by thinking of markets as an ongoing discovery procedure, rather than a static equilibrium.

But Hayek’s main point in Road to Serfdom is that the powers an authority would need to exercise to plan economy are incompatible with democracy, and with most forms of personal and economic choice. Planned economies and illiberal governments are a package deal. If a country chooses that package, it can always go back on it—which is why Hayek isn’t making a slippery slope argument. But if you want a planned economy, you cannot also have a free society. And if you want a free society, you cannot have a planned economy.

Chapter 10 I found genuinely inspiring. Boettke reminds the reader that liberalism must be liberal. It is not conservative, it is dynamic, forward-looking, outgoing, and inclusive, even if people look different, come from different countries, or speak different languages. Liberalism is also not progressive. Liberalism emphasizes bottom-up emergent orders over expert plans.

Liberals—in the correct, classical sense—and conservatives formed an alliance in the mid-20th century based on shared anti-communist beliefs, but they have little in common beyond that. Hayek’s essay “Why I Am Not a Conservative” is a key document here. But Boettke, in prose much more passionate than his usual restrained manner, argues that this odd alliance was overdone in Haeyk’s time, and is irrelevant now that communism is gone.

As a result, some thoroughly illiberal people are using the libertarian label to promote illiberal ideas on race, discrimination, immigration, trade, and other issues. This thought problem is causing a major marketing problem for liberals—not to put too fine a point on it, but as one example, many people confuse the Ludwig von Mises Institute’s ideas for those of Mises himself. This is a problem liberals have created for themselves, and the damage that alliances with shadier parts of the right have inflicted to the liberal cause will not be easy to undo.