Category Archives: Economics

Alvin E. Roth – Who Gets What ― and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design

Alvin E. Roth – Who Gets What ― and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design

Roth co-won the 2012 economics Nobel. His work focuses on solving coordination problems in markets. His most famous work is on matching donors and recipients for kidney transplants. But his insights also apply to other areas from matching college dorm roommates to football bowl game opponents, to marriage matchmaking, to residency and internship assignments for medical school graduates.

He has also greatly improved K-12 school placement systems in cities that allow a limited amount of school choice, such as New York City. In ranked-choice systems, many parents found it in their interest to rank their choices not in their actual order of preference. This level of gamesmanship gummed up the works for both parents and schools, and prevented honest signals from being sent. Borrowing from auction theory, Roth devised a lottery system that worked best when parents honestly ranked their order of preference when applying for schools. This made life simpler for parents, students, and schools, lowered the transaction costs of engaging in the lottery system, and made for better matches all around. Roth advises that similar lessons apply to students applying to college. Apply to the best schools you can, but don’t do early admission unless you have enough information to know that’s your best match. At the same time, apply to some “safe schools” since the better schools tend to be more competitive.

Crucial to Roth’s work is his distinction between thick and thin markets. Thick markets have numerous buyers and sellers with all manner of different preferences. Thin markets are much more difficult to find matches in. Some of the biggest challenges Roth has faced involved thin markets that lack a price system. For example, not only do kidney donations have to match the recipient’s blood type, it is illegal to compensate the donor in every country except, of all places, Iran.

This is where Roth falls short. The obvious solution is to allow price systems to emerge. As numerous economists have pointed out, banning compensated organ donations quite literally kills people. It is one of the most immoral policies a government can enforce. Roth’s work has consisted of second-best workarounds of these bad policies. He has saved hundreds, if not thousands of lives—his Nobel is well-earned. The trouble is that Roth is aware that his matchmaking work treats symptoms rather than problems, and seems content to leave it at that. He does not oppose paid organ donations. But he is also in no hurry to work to change social norms and government policy in a more humane direction.

The astute reader will notice that even in lower-stakes markets where Roth has worked on solving coordination problems, they tend to be either non-profit markets or markets that do not use money. He has devised brilliant systems to work around a lack of a price system, and some good rules of thumb that any non-price market designer can use. But, as with organs, in many cases the better solution is simply to introduce a price system where possible.

At one point, looking back on one of his more successful designs, Roth was proud to view himself as an engineer, rather than a mere student, seeking understanding. This is hubris on his part. Adam Smith famously warned that people are not chess pieces that can be moved around the board as a planner sees fit. The pieces have their own wants and desires. They move on their own in ways nobody can foresee. Roth’s second-best solutions are often improvements. But they are just that—second-best. Even the wisest, most compassionate designer cannot meet peoples’ needs as well as an honest price system can allow people to adapt and create for themselves, on their terms.

CEI Opposes USMCA

This is a joint statement from Iain Murray and me, originally posted at CEI.org.

The Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) today announced its opposition to the USMCA agreement between the United States, Mexico, and Canada.

Statement by CEI Vice President for Strategy Iain Murray and senior fellow Ryan Young:

“While USMCA is not that different from NAFTA, its trade-unrelated provisions and political giveaways set precedents that could harm future trade agreements for decades to come. USMCA’s acronym, which scraps NAFTA’s “F” and “T” standing for “Free Trade,” is more telling than its drafters likely intended.”

Murray and Young make the points that trade negotiations should:

  • Free trade, not manage it.
  • Set economic precedents, not political ones.
  • Allow countries to compete with one another on setting least-onerous regulations, not standardize a one-size-fits-all regulatory regime for all countries.
  • Focus on trade, not include more than 2,000 pages of campaign bragging points and payoffs to political constituencies.

Unfortunately, the USMCA:

  • Preserves NAFTA’s near-zero tariffs between its members but raises several non-tariff barriers, from export quotas to sourcing requirements to monetary policy.
  • Is filled with trade-unrelated provisions that do not belong in a trade agreement. Energy and environmental provisions will narrowly benefit politically connected companies and activists but raise consumer prices and reduce their choices. Regulatory obstacles for automobile parts will dismantle supply chains that have taken decades to build and make new cars even more expensive. Labor provisions, aimed at buying union political support, that will reduce access to Mexican products for U.S. producers and consumers.
  • Will influence how upcoming agreements are made with China, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.

CEI opposed the original NAFTA because its non-tariff barriers and trade-unrelated provisions could become entrenched in future trade agreements – fears that proved well-founded.

Related analysis:

Traders of the Lost Ark

The Ideal U.S.-U.K Free Trade Agreement

USMCA Economic Impact Almost too Small to Measure

This press release was originally posted at CEI.org.

Today, the White House and House Democrats have reportedly reached a deal on terms for a trade deal between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada. But CEI Senior Fellow Ryan Young remains underwhelmed:

“If the deal announced today holds and the revised NAFTA/USMCA passes, its economic impact will be almost too small to measure. But compared to likely alternative policies from the Trump administration, ‘nothing’ is almost certainly better than ‘something’.

“The USMCA leaves intact NAFTA’s biggest achievement—near-zero tariffs between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. On the negative side, USMCA would increase car prices for consumers, add to regulatory complexity, and interfere with international supply chains. On the plus side, more than half of USMCA’s language is taken verbatim from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that the Trump administration withdrew from on its third day in office. The USMCA’s policy stakes are very small. But in terms of damage control, it is potentially very large.”

CEI Vice President for Strategy Iain Murray states:

“Passing USMCA will be a Band Aid on the self-inflicted wound of the global trade war. The administration’s trade policies have raised prices for consumers and cost jobs in the heartland. Without them, the jobs, wages, and growth numbers the President celebrates would be a lot better. It’s only because a lot of tariffs have been delayed that consumers aren’t facing huge price rises this Holiday gift-buying season. USMCA goes a small way to fixing these problems but Congress needs to reclaim trade powers it has delegated to the executive. It should also demand the President works with the WTO in solving the world’s trade woes and punishing bad actors rather than treating it as part of the problem.”

Related analysis:

In the News: Tariffs and Solar Panels

Jessica Towhey quotes me in a syndicated op-ed for Inside Sources about how trade barriers are hurting the market for solar energy:

“China protects its solar makers,” said Ryan Young, a senior fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute. “We can’t copy the mistakes they’re making right now. We can’t insulate the industry from competitive pressures. In the long run, that’s going to hurt the solar industry.”

Read the whole piece here.

Eric H. Cline – 1177 B.C.: The Year Civilization Collapsed

Eric H. Cline – 1177 B.C.: The Year Civilization Collapsed

The Late Bronze Age in the Mediterranean, roughly 1500-1200 B.C., is an under-studied period of history. Egyptians, Minoans, Myceneans, Phoenician, Hittites, Akkadians, Babylonians, Canaanites, Assyrians, Cypriots, and more all had thriving civilizations and a complex web of regional interconnectedness. It was, to that point, the most prosperous period in all of human history. Some of their interactions were peaceful, such as in the spread of trade, language, and writing. Other interactions, less so. The first battles with written eyewitness accounts date from this period. Ramses II of Egypt had his epic Battle of Kadesh against Muwatalli II of the Hittites around 1250 BC, of which interested readers can find a dramatic retelling in Norman Mailer’s novel Ancient Evenings. The Trojan War happened sometime around 1200 BC.

Most of Cline’s book is a narrative regional history of roughly a 300-year period ending around the time of the book’s title, 1177 B.C. Around this time, most of those civilizations collapsed. Archaeological records show most major cities were burned, and surviving written sources tell of invasions by Sea Peoples, about whom little is known beyond their ferocity and foreignness. Cline chose 1177 B.C. as a landmark date because in that year, the Egyptian pharaoh Ramses III fought the Sea Peoples’ second invasion, and lost. Just as historians use the sack of Rome in 476 A.D. as shorthand for a longer-term process of collapse, Cline doesn’t literally mean the Late Bronze Age ended in 1177 B.C. That invasion was simply the most visible event in a multi-generation process.

Historians have long thought these Sea Peoples were the main culprit of the rapid region-wide collapse. Cline is not so sure, and many modern scholars agree. Cline also explains recent attempts to figure out just who they were. At present, the best guess is they were not a unified civilization. They likely came from the Northern Mediterranean. One such people are the Shekelesh, who were from Sicily, and likely gave the island its name.

It takes Cline until almost the end of the book to get to the freaking point, but his thesis is essentially a “systems collapse” argument. One thing didn’t go wrong around 1177, everything did. The Late Bronze Age civilizations endured long-term drought, famine, foreign invasions, political changes that lopped off an elite class, wars with each other, and even some earthquakes, all around the same time. None of these factors on their own would have been enough to topple civilizations. Taken together, the cascade effect was fatal.

Cline also argues that the region’s cosmopolitan interconnectedness was a factor in their undoing. When one fell, the others were weakened, and on it went, in a domino effect. Here, I disagree, for much the same reason that investors diversify their portfolios.

Suppose a famine strikes one city-state. At any given time, it is unlikely that the entire region is simultaneously having poor harvests. The stricken city can reach out to others for help. By the Late Bronze Age, agriculture was already five or six millennia old. If, say, every fifth year or so would be a bad year in a given place, then every place knew to plan on growing about a fifth more than what it needs for itself. During good years, it would trade this surplus to needy neighbors. During their own bad years, neighbors in better shape would have their own surplus available for trade. This interconnectedness smooths out year-to-year volatility, making each part of the whole stronger.

The troubles of 1177 or thereabouts happened because drought and other disasters hit region-wide, instead of in select local spots. Even a diversified trading network couldn’t overcome that shock.

If anything, the limits of interconnectedness played a role. Transportation was slow and costly back then. Even though there was likely some long-distance trade with the breadbasket regions of Eastern and Northern Europe and with India, it would have been limited to durable goods such as wood and metals. Wheat and other crops would not have survived the trip—or might not have arrived in time to help. There is a reason why today’s only famines are politically created. Global interconnectedness today is stronger than even the forces of nature.

Wars and skirmishes among Bronze Age kings did not affect the vast majority of people, who were busy in the fields. The biggest battles and sieges of cities were one-time events involving tens of thousands of people. This is out of a population of millions, or perhaps tens of millions. These rare catastrophes dominate the written sources, hence why historians focus on them so heavily. But proportionally, they were often unimportant for the region’s standard of living. Written records can only be made by people who know how to write, and in the Bronze Age that was only a select few people, mostly state functionaries and merchants. This availability bias in the sources means that historians who single out war or invasion as a primary culprit for the 1177 B.C. collapse are likely overselling their case.

Cline’s wider system collapse argument has merit. But his argument that interconnectedness was a source of weakness is almost certainly in error.

Vlad Tarko – Elinor Ostrom: An Intellectual Biography

Vlad Tarko – Elinor Ostrom: An Intellectual Biography 

Tarko is quickly establishing himself as a top-notch economist. In this, his first book, he offers the best available introduction to Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom’s work and the concept of polycentrism. Ostrom was the first, and so far the only, woman to win the economics Nobel [Update: I wrote this review before Esther Duflo co-won the 2019 prize in October]. She and her husband Vincent, also an accomplished economist and political scientist, ran a famous Workshop at Indiana University where they paid less attention to disciplinary boundaries than they did to solid theoretical and empirical research.

Elinor Ostrom also popularized the concept of polycentrism. It’s essentially a more finely graded version of federalism. The United States’ federal system has three main levels of government—federal, state, and local, plus a few in-between grades, most commonly counties. But not all services, Ostrom argues, fit cleanly into one of those categories. Services such as parks, police, and schools, have nothing to do with each other. They may also have different optimum characteristics. So why are they often provided at the same fixed level of government? What if a school district’s optimum size extends beyond a city’s boundaries? What if a park district would be better run as multiple, hyperlocal districts? Moreover, these optimum sizes will vary from place to place. A further complication is that these optimum sizes and structures are constantly changing and evolving as culture, technology, and demographics change. Nothing else stays the same, so why should the sizes of government “firms?”

From this polycentric framework, Ostrom teases out some ground rules for institutional design. One is that smaller is usually better. Most federal issues can be more effectively handled at the state level. Many state-level issues can be handled at smaller gradients, whether regional water or irrigation authorities, transportation authorities, or neighborhood-based policing, a term which now means nearly the opposite of what it did when Ostrom began using the term. Two, because times change, institutions need to be designed with flexibility in mind. They need to be able to grow, shrink, merge, separate, and evolve as circumstances dictate. The goal is the service, not this or that corporate structure, so make change easy.

Ostrom was much more than a theorist. She placed a far greater emphasis on field research than most scholars. This empirical backing greatly improved not just her own work, but that of her many students and collaborators. Tarko shares pictures, stories, and the research she conducted across the country and abroad over her long career. For an introduction to her thought and her broader approach, Tarko is an excellent place to start.

In the Media: Trade

The Washington Examiner‘s Sean Higgins quotes me in a piece looking ahead to trade policy in 2020:

Ryan Young, a trade policy expert at the libertarian Competitive Enterprise Institute, expects that Trump will ratchet up the trade wars because tariffs seem to be the only strategy he has. Pulling back from the trade war would mean not getting concessions from Beijing. “Trump is getting frustrated that he is not getting the results that he wants, but instead of trying something else, he is going to lean on tariffs, because that is his primary engine of policy,” Young said. “I don’t see him using anything else.”

Read the whole thing here.

In the Media: Tariffs

I am quoted on President Trump’s new steel and aluminum tariffs against Brazil and Argentina in Politico ‘s Morning Money and The Washington Times.

Steven Levy – In The Plex: How Google Thinks, Works, and Shapes Our Lives

Steven Levy – In The Plex: How Google Thinks, Works, and Shapes Our Lives

A corporate history of Google from its founding up until 2011 or so. This book was written with the cooperation of Google’s founders, so it is not an objective history, nor should it be treated as such. It is still useful. A sequel may also be in order before too long. Since this book was published, Google has created its own parent company, Alphabet, and diversified into areas from video to maps to driverless cars. It is also undergoing multiple antitrust investigations, and growing ire from right and left populists could have massive consequences for consumer welfare, innovation, and for competition policy going forward.

Google has changed quite a bit since its early days, but anything violating the consumer welfare standard is difficult to find in here—though, again, this book is not an objective history. If anything, fear of regulatory reprisal put a damper on some of Google’s innovative ideas almost as soon as they realized the company would be a success. That, as opposed to market share for searches or advertising, is evidence of consumer harm.

Some of Google’s early mistakes and learning experiences still loom large today, such as its acquiescence to Chinese censorship.

Levy also has a forthcoming book on Facebook out in January 2020.

President Trump should Walk Back New Steel, Aluminum Tariffs against Brazil, Argentina

This is a CEI press release, originally posted at CEI.org.

President Trump this morning announced via Twitter that he is imposing steel and aluminum tariffs against Brazil and Argentina. Tariffs won’t help farmers or manufacturers, warns CEI Senior Fellow Ryan Young:

“President Trump wrongly believes these new steel and aluminum tariffs will help American farmers. Trump should instead remove the tariffs that sparked the trade war and shrank farmers’ export markets in the first place. Today’s new tariffs will have little effect on agriculture but will harm other industries and consumers. More than three quarters of steel goes to construction and automobiles, for example. Before Trump partially rolled back his initial steel and aluminum tariffs, steel prices had spiked enough to add $250 to the cost of most new cars. Those tariffs have so far contributed to more than 15,000 layoffs at auto and steel companies.

“Congress urgently needs to repeal Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and similar clauses that enable such irresponsible presidential tariff-making behavior. Tariffs are harming the United States both economically and diplomatically.”​

Related reports:

·       Common Myths and Facts about Trade

·       Traders of the Lost Ark