Category Archives: Economics

Politics by Meme

Here is a political meme that has been making the rounds on social media:

No photo description available.

I agree with this one of this meme’s main points–the federal government spends too much on corporate welfare. But its numbers are way off.

  • The biggest tax most $50,000 earners pay is the 15.3 percent FICA tax, which pays for Social Security and Medicare. That’s $7,650 on a $50,000 income, and it isn’t in the meme’s list.
  • Medicare, at 2.9 percentage points of the 15.3% FICA tax, costs $1,450 on a $50,000 income, not $235.81–plus premiums, if applicable. The meme is wrong here by more than six-fold. Not six percent, six-fold.
  • Spending $4,000 on corporate welfare implies that about 8 percent of national income goes to corporate welfare, or about $1.7 trillion. The actual figure is likely between $100 and $200 billion–a precise figure is impossible due to a lack of government transparency, and disagreements over definitions. Even allowing for substantial wiggle room, here the meme is off by as much as 10-fold. That is an entire order of magnitude.
  • A $50,000 earner spending $247.75 on military spending implies a military that spends more than $1 trillion. That is about $300 billion higher than the actual figure. The meme is wrong here by almost half. Though to be fair, much military spending is corporate welfare, and is unnecessary for national security besides.

Again, this meme makes a point I agree with about corporate welfare. It confirms my priors. But it does so dishonestly. Its numbers are wrong, often by multiples. And its errors all favor the point it tries to make. That one-sided tilt means its mistakes are probably not just random error. Whoever made it is hurting a good cause.

I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again. Politics-by-meme is harmful. Do not engage in it. Political memes are as bad as cable news. Their numbers are often dodgy. Their primary accomplishments are feeding confirmation bias while intensifying people’s unhealthy tribal tendencies to affirm one’s in-group affiliation while vilifying out-groups. Political memes add heat without light at a time when the opposite approach is badly needed.

Immanuel Wallerstein – The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century

Immanuel Wallerstein – The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century

Wallerstein was the primary creator of the core-periphery framework that many historians use to view world economic history. This 1974 book started it all. Several publishers rejected his initial manuscript, but when he did finally get it published, it caught on quickly. Wallerstein eventually completed four volumes in the series before he passed away in 2019.

In the context of the 16th century, the first major core country was Spain, though the Netherlands and England eventually overtook it as silver-induced inflation and the costs of empire caused Spanish decline. The two periods of Spanish dominance and Dutch-English dominance make up what Wallerstein calls the long 16th century. The periphery economies were the somewhat nearby countries that traded with these core economies throughout the long 16th century, and on through later periods.

Typically, periphery economies provide raw materials and food, which the core countries either consume or turn into more finished products. At this stage of the world economy, there were still countries outside of the European core-periphery network. For Wallerstein, these are simply separate economic systems. The boundaries are fluid, and Wallerstein was quick to point out that his categories are not categorical. Countries such as Poland and the Ukraine were nearly always periphery countries in this period. Russia went in and out of the periphery over the years. Farther-off countries such as India and China had their own independent core-periphery networks.

By the 20th century, with industrialization, mass media, and air travel, the entire world was unified into a single core-periphery system. In this book’s focus, the two-part “long 16th century,” this had not yet happened. But this was also the period when that process began in earnest, which is why Wallerstein’s larger project began there.

Wallerstein was a Marxist, and it shows in his hyper-materialist view of history, and his neglect of individuals in favor of focusing on aggregates such as nations, regions, and classes. It also causes him to ignore non-material factors such as culture, art, social norms about openness and progress, and more. Though he favorably cites Douglass North a few times, proving at least some engagement with the economic history literature, he also is not the most astute economic analyst, especially in matters of monetary policy. He seems not to grasp the concepts of equilibrium, the neutrality of money, or the law of one price. These shortcomings are not fatal to his core-periphery thesis, but they don’t help his case.

As the world becomes ever more prosperous in the 21st century, Wallerstein’s core-periphery framework is quickly becoming obsolete. It’s not the worst way to view the history of empires of colonialism, which are based on exploitation and hierarchy. But the world of the post-1800 Great Enrichment is based increasingly on equal exchange and cross-cultural tolerance and respect. There is a long way to go, obviously, and there will be stutters and reversal. But if the process continues, Wallerstein’s thesis will age as poorly as his Marxism already has.

William Dalrymple – The Anarchy: The East India Company, Corporate Violence, and the Pillage of an Empire

William Dalrymple – The Anarchy: The East India Company, Corporate Violence, and the Pillage of an Empire

The East India Company (EIC) was one of history’s largest monopolies. Its story is relevant to today’s antitrust debate, and the larger question of where the private sector ends and the public sector begins. Dalrymple seems eager to paint a portrait of capitalist and corporate greed, but the facts won’t quite allow it. He grudgingly allows that the EIC was not a free-market institution, but he often insists on treating it that way just the same.

The EIC was a public-private partnership from the start, and received government bailouts. It had de facto taxing authority in India, a power no fully private company enjoys. The EIC had its own 200,000-strong army, twice the size of the British army. The East India Company was a government in everything but name, and it acted like it, to the point of toppling India’s existing government in 1765 and replacing it with itself.

Contemporary economists and philosophers such as Adam Smith and even the conservative Edmund Burke opposed empire and its accoutrements not just on moral grounds, but on fiscal grounds. Ventures such as the EIC cost the government more than they made from it.

Dalrymple doesn’t go into this as much as he should, but the EIC’s story shows that there is no bright line where the private sector ends and government begins. This kind of philosophical discussion would have been very useful for clarifying his message.

The lessons from the East India Company’s story apply to today’s climate of too-big-to-fail, bailouts for politically connected industries, and subsidy programs for businesses big and small. All of these nearly always come with political strings attached, and mix together the public and private in ways few outside of the economics profession expected. Beneficiary companies become executors of government policy, rather than engines of value creation.

In the EIC’s case, this meant corruption, coups, atrocities, war crimes, and racially motivated mass murders. Today’s rent-seekers’ interests are mostly limited to greed, fortunately. But they are still worth fighting about, and EIC’s cautionary tale is useful for that fight.

Kimberly Clausing – Open: The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital

Kimberly Clausing – Open: The Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital

This is a book that needed to be written. Progressives have long had a complicated relationship with trade and immigration. On one side, there is a free-trade tradition including progressive heroes such as Cordell Hull, FDR’s Secretary of State; President John F. Kennedy, who passed the 1962 Trade Expansion Act and after whom a major round of liberalizing GATT negotiations was named; and Bill Clinton, who signed NAFTA in to law.

On the other side, the progressive movement’s labor and environmental wings often have at best a transactional relationship with free trade, and at worst an outright hostility to it. Many younger people with social democratic leanings, as well as the older generation of presidential candidates, such as Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, have views on trade that are almost identical to President Trump’s. This is a problem Clausing seeks to address.

She mostly makes the usual economists’ arguments in favor of free trade and immigration. This is fine; trade scholars are not her intended audience, progressives are. Clausing’s progressive credentials help to open the ears of an audience that is often closed to similar messages from different messengers. One particular reason that should resonate more than it does is that free trade and liberal immigration are extremely effective anti-poverty policies. And here, Clausing does a good job of explaining why. But she encounters two problems in her book, one of which is not her doing.

Part of the problem in getting more progressives to support pro-poor trade and immigration policies ties into a political realignment that is currently happening, as the historian Stephen Davies and my colleague Iain Murray have been arguing. For most of the post-war period, the dominant political debate was capitalism vs. socialism. Most people and political parties placed themselves somewhere on that spectrum, and thought of themselves in those terms. That dynamic is largely gone now. Just as conservatives under Trump are no longer a free-market-lite party, progressives are no longer a socialism-lite party, younger social democrats’ pretensions to the contrary. Their fight is on different grounds now.

People are beginning to realign themselves on a different axis—nationalism vs. globalism. Conservatives are rapidly taking over the nationalist side. But progressives haven’t quite chosen their path yet—this complicate’s Clausing’s job. Part of the problem is personality. Trump provides a strongly nationalist figure for conservatives to rally around. As of this writing the progressive side lacks such a figure, whether also a nationalist or more cosmopolitan. There is not likely room for two nationalist parties, but Democrats still haven’t made their choice. If Clausing pushes them in the cosmopolitan direction, she will have done a major service.

These political realignments happen every few generations. The current realignment is neither the first nor last time something like this will happen. But it does explain an awful lot of strange political bedfellows in recent years. Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump essentially have the same immigration beliefs, and for similar reasons. Fox News host Tucker Carlson was surprised to find himself very much agreeing with Democratic Senator and presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren’s economic patriotism plan.

Large parts of Open also have little to with trade and immigration. I am unsure of whether this is a good thing or a bad thing. Her digressions on taxes, regulations, and inequality are standard-issue, and progressives will find little to object to. On the plus side, this can make her market-liberal trade and immigration stances more palatable, especially to progressives still unsure about their place on the nationalism-cosmopolitanism divide. On the other hand, her proposed regulatory policies would reduce the benefits of open trade and immigration. And her views on inequality focus on ratios, rather than people, precisely opposite the liberal approach that would help the poor. For more on this, see Iain Murray’s and my papers on the subject, “People, Not Ratios” and “The Rising Tide.”

Flaws and all, Clausing has written an important book that has the potential to do a lot of good. Ideally, she will not only nudge progressives in a more free-market direction on trade and immigration policy, she will encourage them to take a more cosmopolitan stance in order to provide an effective opposition to an increasingly nationalist conservative movement.

Andrew McAfee – More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources—and What Happens Next

Andrew McAfee – More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources—and What Happens Next

This would be good for an undergraduate economics course. McAfee’s thesis captures the core insights of economic growth and what causes it. He also makes the true but unpopular case that prosperity results in a cleaner environment. Poverty pollutes. In wealthy countries, people can afford to care about environmental quality, and also develop more efficient production processes that cause less harm in the first place. McAfee never uses the term, but economists call this phenomenon the environmental Kuznets curve. Basically, pollution and other harms increase until a country reaches roughly $4,500-$5,000 of per capital GDP. At that level of wealth, people don’t have to worry as much about their next meal will come from, or basics such as sturdy shelter and tolerable sanitation. Children can go to school instead of working on the farm. With those needs mostly being met, people then become interested in next-level wants, which include a clean environment.

McAfee writes a simple, direct style that reads a little bit like an introductory textbook. He also doesn’t go into the nitty-gritty the way similar works by authors like Hans Rosling, Matt Ridley, and others do. This isn’t a bad thing; he’s serving a different niche than they are.

He is quite direct in stating his belief that free markets are the reason most of the world are now on the right side of the environmental Kuznets curve, and that markets are why he is confident enough that improvements will continue. So confident that he is willing to bet his own money that numerous indicators will improve—see his website for more, and to bet against him if you wish. He is willing to wager up to $100,000 of his own money.

In the Media: USMCA

Yesterday’s New York Times notes CEI’s opposition to USMCA:

Free traders have also panned the deal, which aims to encourage North American manufacturing by raising barriers to products made outside the continent. The Competitive Enterprise Institute, a nonprofit public policy organization that advocates limited government, announced that the new agreement’s “trade-unrelated provisions and political giveaways set precedents that could harm future trade agreements for decades to come.”

Full article here. Iain Murray’s and my joint statement opposing USMCA is here.

In the Media: USMCA

The Wall Street Journal‘s Jeffrey Sparshott quotes me in this morning’s Real Time Economics newsletter:

Don’t Call it Nafta

The House of Representatives approved President Trump’s amended North American trade pact on Thursday. The U.S. Mexico Canada Agreement, or USMCA, passed by a 385 to 41 vote. The Senate is expected to approve the legislation early next year, after which the president would sign it into law. Mexico’s Senate has approved the deal, but it needs ratification in Canada to enter into force and replace the North American Free Trade Agreement, or Nafta.

The Competitive Enterprise Institute’s Ryan Young: “Its economic impact will be almost too small to measure.”

The newsletter is here. My original statement is here. Iain Murray and I came out against USMCA here.

Bryan Caplan and Zach Weinersmith – Open Borders: The Science and Ethics of Immigration

Bryan Caplan and Zach Weinersmith – Open Borders: The Science and Ethics of Immigration

A graphic novel about immigration policy, and a superbly done one at that. Caplan, a former professor of mine at George Mason, wrote most of the words. Weinersmith, creator of the Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal web comic, did the artwork and many of the jokes.

This book is aimed at skeptics, and Caplan and Weinsersmith do a much better job of appealing to them than most people do. In some ways, Open Borders is an example of what happens when someone is able to pass an ideological Turing test—a concept Caplan coined in 2011. They are routinely charitable to their opponents, and confront their strongest arguments as their proponents actually present them. This is much more effective than building up straw men and knocking them down, leaving the original argument untouched. It is also more difficult, which is why many people do not bother.

If immigration restrictionists pick up the book—and early sales figures suggest some of them are—Caplan and Weinersmith should allay a lot of peoples’ fears with their calm, accessible presentation that is rigorously backed with data and research (interested readers can consult roughly 30 pages worth of notes at the back of the book). They convey a tone that is light-hearted and serious at the same time, which is not an easy balance to strike. And even if they don’t convince very many people to embrace open borders, the sheer weight of data, theory, philosophy, and morality in their favor should at least push most readers a little bit in their direction at the margin.

Caplan and Weinersmith make a very good team. Hopefully they collaborate again in the future.

On the Radio: China Trade

On Monday, December 16 at 6:35 AM ET, I’ll be on Richmond’s Morning News with John Reid on WRVA to talk China and trade.

That’s 5:35 AM for me here in the Central time zone. Fortunately, I’m always happy to talk trade policy.

Phase One of a China-U.S. Trade Agreement and the Ratchet Effect

As of Friday, December 13th, the U.S. and Chinese governments have agreed in principle to phase one of a trade agreement. The Chinese government will purchase more U.S. agricultural products, and according to The Wall Street Journal, “Mr. Wang [China’s Vice Minister of Commerce] said that the agreement would cover a range of contentious issues, including agriculture, intellectual property protection, technology transfer and liberalization of the financial sector, without elaborating.” The U.S. will hold off on a planned tariff increase set for Sunday, December 15th. It will also decrease tariffs on $120 billion of Chinese goods from 15 percent to 7.5 percent.

Details are still sketchy at this point, and are subject to change. The agreement also needs to be formally ratified by both countries. It is unclear how long this would take. President Trump also has a history backing out of already-announced major policy changes, and might do so again at any time. This might partially explain Beijing’s muted tone, and why they did not announce such a significant deal until after Beijing’s markets closed. A sudden gain on Friday’s news could be wiped out, or worse, on Monday if Trump backs out over the weekend.

But for the sake of argument, suppose phase one is ratified smoothly. Where would U.S.-China trade stand? It would still be worse off than just a few years ago. Both countries’ trade barriers would remain higher than before the trade war started. The trade war is a fresh example of the “ratchet effect” Robert Higgs warned about in his classic book Crisis and Leviathan. A crisis results in expanded government power, which is never fully walked back. Post-crisis leviathan remains larger on net.

In this case, a fabricated crisis over Trump’s misunderstanding of trade deficits has created a new trade leviathan. If it is ever tamed, it will take years. Both U.S. political parties are taking a populist turn. Chinese President Xi Jinping has spent six years consistently re-centralizing China’s economy and rejecting needed economic and political liberalization. Tariffs from the U.S. are clearly not encouraging better behavior. In this political climate, two years of trade mistakes might take a generation to fix, or longer. Both countries would be better off if they had never fought a trade war in the first place.

Many of China’s promised phase one reforms are vague, and difficult or impossible to measure. It is also unclear what will happen to China’s retaliatory tariff increases, which are penalizing U.S. exporters even as China has lowered its tariffs against the rest of the world over the last two years. The ratchet will remain tighter than before the trade war. It is just a question now of how much tighter.

The story is similar for the U.S., which will keep in place 25 percent tariffs against $250 billion worth of Chinese goods that did not exist two years ago. Those still-new tariffs will keep consumer prices artificially high after phase one passes. Companies in all manner of industries will still be scrambling for ways to adapt to suddenly higher costs and disrupted supply chains.

Businesses in both countries are having to make important long-run decisions right now with no idea of what’s to come next. This is bad for investment, and one reason the risk of recession in the U.S. remains uncomfortably high despite an otherwise-excellent economy.

President Trump has said that phase two negotiations will begin immediately, but there is no indication yet what his goals are for phase two, what its timetable will be, how many phases there will be, or what Trump’s ultimate policy goals are. These will be Trump’s problems for at most another five years. Most businesses hope to be around for rather longer than that, and would like to be able to plan accordingly.